Finlay, R. v

For an offence under section 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, a person who actively participates in the mechanics of an injection may be a principal even though the recipient injects herself and commits no offence. Liability cannot rest on aiding and abetting self-injection, since self-injection is not an offence against another person.

Whether the defendant caused the administration or taking is a question of fact and degree. A voluntary act by the recipient does not automatically break causation. The jury must decide, using common sense, whether that act was an ordinary occurrence in the situation created by the defendant or an extraordinary intervention.

The appellant was tried at Winchester Crown Court on two alternative counts of unlawful act manslaughter following the death of Jasmine Grosvenor from a heroin overdose. The prosecution alleged either that he injected her himself or that he prepared the heroin, loaded a syringe and handed it to her, after which she injected herself.

The jury could not agree on the direct-injection count, but convicted on the alternative count. The appellant contended that, if the deceased injected herself, the count should not have been left to the jury because his acts could not amount to causing the administration or taking of heroin under section 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

1. Appeal dismissed. It was open to the trial judge to leave the alternative count to the jury, and the directions on causation were correct.
2. Self-injection of heroin is not an offence under section 23 because the person does not administer a noxious thing to another. Accordingly, a helper cannot be liable as an accessory to the recipient’s self-injection. The reasoning in R v Kennedy [1999] Crim.L.R 65, insofar as it proceeded on that basis, was wrong.
3. That conclusion does not prevent liability as a joint principal. R v Rogers [2003] 1 WLR 1374 established that a person who actively participates in the injection process performs an actus reus under section 23 where that act causes the administration. The appellant’s alleged acts of preparing heroin, loading the syringe and handing it over could therefore found liability, notwithstanding that the deceased performed the final injection.
4. The causal issue was for the jury. Applying Environment Agency v Empress Car Company Limited [1999] 2 AC 22, the deceased’s act did not as a rule of law break the chain of causation. The jury had to decide whether it was an ordinary occurrence in the circumstances created by the appellant, or an extraordinary event that meant his conduct was not causative. The appellant did not have to be the sole cause.
5. On the evidence, it was open to a jury to regard the deceased’s use of the prepared syringe as an ordinary occurrence. That conclusion did not require proof that she lacked capacity or had ceased to act rationally. The judge’s directions accurately stated the governing law.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction for unlawful act manslaughter.
• Crown Court at Winchester: the jury convicted the appellant on the alternative manslaughter count based on section 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The jury could not reach a verdict on the direct-injection count and were discharged from returning a verdict on it.