Arrowcroft Group Plc v First Secretary of State

Under section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the development plan has statutory priority, but the decision-maker need not use a rigid or universally prescribed method of analysis. The proposal must be assessed against the relevant provisions of the plan, viewed as a whole, and material considerations must then be identified and weighed. A conflict with particular policies does not necessarily mean that the proposal is out of accordance with the plan.

The court’s role remains supervisory. It may intervene for legal error, failure to consider a material matter, inadequate reasons, irrationality, apparent bias or procedural unfairness, but the weight given to planning considerations is for the decision-maker.

The claimant challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 the Secretary of State’s refusal of planning permission for a mixed business, housing, golf and leisure development at Waterside Park.

The application had been called in, considered at a public inquiry, and previously refused. That earlier decision was quashed by consent. On redetermination, the Secretary of State refused permission because of deficiencies concerning replacement golf provision, conflict with development-plan leisure policies, the proposed housing on greenfield land, and inconsistency with adopted and emerging regional planning policy.

The issues were whether the Secretary of State had misdirected himself on section 54A and emerging regional policy, failed to give adequate reasons or consider material matters, acted irrationally, or breached the rules against apparent bias and procedural unfairness.

1. Application refused. The claimant was ordered to pay the First Secretary of State’s costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. Permission to appeal was refused, although 28 days were allowed for any application to the Court of Appeal.
2. Section 54A gives the development plan priority, but does not impose a mechanical two-stage process or require the decision-maker always to determine whether the proposal accords with the plan as a whole. The decision-maker must identify and properly interpret relevant plan policies, assess the proposal in the context of the plan, identify relevant material considerations, and decide what weight they should receive. That is an exercise of planning judgment. The Secretary of State’s conclusion that there was general conformity with policy DEN1 but inconsistency with criterion (h), policies L3 and L12, and other material policies disclosed no legal misdirection.
3. The Secretary of State was entitled to treat the emerging RPG13 policies, including the sequential preference for previously developed land in policy DP1, as material and stronger than the adopted regional policy. His conclusion that inclusion in the NWDA list of strategic sites should carry little weight was reasonably open to him.
4. The reasons were adequate when read in context. A decision letter need not rehearse every argument or specify the precise weight assigned to competing considerations. It sufficiently explained the concerns about regeneration, housing land, density, golf provision and the distinction between Waterside Park and the brownfield Wavertree site.
5. The Secretary of State had considered the economic regeneration benefits and was not required to explain how the development-plan objective should be achieved in the abstract. His assessment of weight was not irrational.
6. The apparent-bias test was whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. Calling in the application, political disagreement, departing from the Inspector’s recommendation, and the handling of correspondence did not satisfy that test. The procedural safeguards described in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions were complied with. No material or new representations were taken into account without disclosure to the parties.

The judgment describes an earlier refusal of planning permission which was quashed by consent by order dated 1 November 2001 and sealed on 27 November 2001. The present proceedings concerned the Secretary of State’s subsequent redetermination and refusal dated 14 November 2002.