Huntingdon Life Sciences Group Plc & Anor v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) & Ors

Section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is not apt to protect a corporation from harassment where the statutory interpretation would also expose breach of the injunction to criminal liability. It can, however, protect individuals who are specifically targeted by repeated conduct resembling stalking, even where the campaign forms part of a mass protest. Representative proceedings may be brought for an appropriate group of employees. Interim injunctions, including exclusion zones, may be granted where the evidence establishes an arguable case of unlawful harassment and urgent protection is needed. The court must balance freedom of speech and assembly against the victims’ rights to protection from serious and continuing interference.

The claimants sought an interim injunction under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Huntingdon Life Sciences and its subsidiary alleged a prolonged campaign involving demonstrations, threats, visits to employees’ homes, damage, harassing communications and publication of personal details. The second claimant, the managing director, sought relief personally and on behalf of the first claimant’s employees under CPR Part 19.6.

The claim also sought to bind SHAC, its members and other protestors. The defendants challenged the use of the Act to protect a company and individuals against mass protest, the representative nature of the claim, the breadth of the proposed injunction and the use of exclusion zones. The central questions were whether the Act applied to the alleged conduct and whether interim relief was justified.

1. Corporations. The court held that the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was not apt to found an injunction at the suit of the claimant corporations. The reasoning in DPP v Dziurzynski showed that the Act was not intended to criminalise harassment directed at a limited company. The same interpretation applied in civil proceedings because breach of the civil injunction could itself constitute a criminal offence.
2. Individuals. The Act was apt to protect the second claimant and employees where the conduct was directed specifically at individuals, including targeting their homes and workplaces and publishing their details to encourage further harassment. Although arising in the context of protest, the conduct was sufficiently analogous to stalking.
3. Representative proceedings. CPR Part 19.6 provided an appropriate basis for the second claimant to proceed on behalf of the employees. The court also found an arguable basis for proceedings against persons whose identities were unknown but who could be shown to belong to, or act in association with, a relevant organisation or class.
4. Scope of relief. Exclusion zones were lawful, but should not be imposed readily. The court had to reconcile the defendants’ rights to free speech and assembly with the claimants’ rights to protection. The breadth of any restraint had to be necessary, and the duration and interim nature of the order were relevant.
5. Disposition. The evidence disclosed an arguable case against all defendants. The imminent rally justified interim relief and the wide terms sought, as amended after the earlier hearing. An interim injunction was granted in those terms, pending a full hearing.

First-instance decision. The judgment records that Davis J adjourned the initial ex parte application on 9 April 2003 so that notice could be given. The application was then heard by Mr Justice Pitchers.