Graham, R (on the application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions

On judicial review of a Crown Court decision on appeal from a speeding conviction, the reviewing court does not decide whether the tribunal reached the correct factual conclusion. It intervenes only where the conclusion was one which no reasonable court, properly considering the evidence, could have reached. A speeding conviction may be based on officers’ visual estimates of speed. Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, section 89(2), prevents conviction solely on the opinion evidence of one witness, but does not prevent conviction based on the evidence of two witnesses. The court’s own view of the evidence is irrelevant where the Crown Court’s conclusion is reasonable.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Crown Court’s dismissal of his appeal against a conviction by the Worthing Magistrates for exceeding a 30-mile-per-hour speed limit. The conviction was based on the visual estimates of two experienced police officers, who had not used a speed-measuring device. The Crown Court concluded that it was sure the claimant had exceeded the limit. The central issue was whether that factual conclusion was legally unreasonable and therefore amenable to judicial review.

1. Application dismissed. The Crown Court’s decision was not one which no reasonable court, properly considering the evidence, could have reached. There were therefore no grounds for judicial review.
2. Judicial review was not an opportunity to reconsider whether the Crown Court had reached the correct factual conclusion. The Crown Court was the tribunal responsible for deciding the facts. The Administrative Court could intervene only if the conclusion was irrational in the relevant sense: one which no reasonable court, properly considering the evidence, could have reached.
3. There was no legal bar to a speeding prosecution succeeding on opinion evidence from officers who had visually estimated the vehicle’s speed. Section 89(2) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 prevented conviction solely on the evidence of one witness expressing an opinion that the vehicle exceeded the specified limit. It did not prevent reliance on the combined evidence of two witnesses.
4. The officers’ experience and their evidence about their ability to estimate speed were matters for the Crown Court to assess. Their evidence was capable of supporting the conclusion reached, notwithstanding the short distance over which the vehicle was observed and the competing account given by the claimant.
5. It was irrelevant that the judge conducting the judicial review considered it likely that he would have reached the same conclusion had he been sitting in the Crown Court. The legality of the Crown Court’s decision, rather than the reviewing court’s preferred factual assessment, was decisive.
6. Costs of £250 were ordered against the claimant. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused, and the court stated that it could not certify that the case involved a question of public importance.

1. Crown Court at Chichester: dismissed the claimant’s appeal against his conviction by the Worthing Magistrates on 11 March 2002.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the judicial review application and ordered the claimant to pay £250 costs.