Attorney General v Ratra

Where the statutory conditions for a vexatious litigant order are satisfied, the High Court retains a discretion whether to make the order. The court may make a civil proceedings order under Supreme Court Act 1981, s 42, where the litigation is objectively vexatious and a narrower litigation-friend requirement would leave a material risk of further abusive proceedings. The statutory procedure provides a centralised safeguard: future proceedings require High Court permission, following consideration of whether they are an abuse of process and have reasonable grounds. A civil proceedings order may properly remain in force indefinitely where the circumstances justify that course.

The Attorney General applied under s 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against Mr Ratra. The application had previously been adjourned because of concerns about his mental capacity. Updated psychiatric evidence indicated that he was unable to manage his own affairs and required a litigation friend.

Mr Ratra accepted that the statutory criteria were met. He argued that the court should exercise its discretion by making a declaration under Part 21(3) requiring future proceedings to be brought through a litigation friend, rather than making a vexatious litigant order. The central issue was whether that alternative provided an adequate and appropriate response.

1. Disposition. The court made a civil proceedings order under s 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, without limit of time.
2. The fact that the statutory criteria in s 42(1) were satisfied did not make an order automatic. The court retained a discretion to decide whether such an order was appropriate in all the circumstances. Mr Ratra’s concession on the criteria therefore did not determine the application.
3. The court considered that the history of approximately 66 claims, many arising from one incident and progressively involving additional defendants on increasingly spurious grounds, provided objective justification for a civil proceedings order. The possible underlying mental illness did not remove the need for effective control of the litigation.
4. A requirement that future proceedings be instituted only through a litigation friend was not an adequate alternative. It left a risk that an unsuitable litigation friend might be appointed and that courts would not know the wider background of vexatious litigation. By contrast, the statutory order enabled the name of the litigant to be circulated through the civil courts and required applications for leave to be considered by a High Court judge.
5. The court therefore exercised its discretion in favour of an indefinite order. Mr Justice Pitchford agreed with Lord Justice Scott Baker.

The judgment describes earlier procedural steps but is itself a first-instance decision in the Administrative Court.

• Divisional Court: the application was previously adjourned to obtain updated information about capacity.
• Central London County Court: proceedings issued by Mr Ratra were stayed.
• High Court: a Grepe v Loam type restriction was imposed and later upheld by Sullivan J.
• Administrative Court: the court made the indefinite civil proceedings order.