Das, R (on the application of) v General Medical Council

When reviewing an interim suspension imposed by a professional regulatory body, the court must give due weight to the body’s knowledge and expertise. Intervention requires a proper legal or evidential basis; disagreement with factual conclusions is insufficient where the decision was supported by evidence. Suspension of a medical practitioner considered unsuitable to practise does not, without more, constitute inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The claimant sought an order under section 41(A)(10) of the Medical Act 1983 terminating or altering his suspension from registration as a medical practitioner. The suspension had been imposed by the General Medical Council’s Interim Orders Committee following complaints and concerns about his professional performance. The claimant challenged the committee’s factual conclusions, alleged improper political considerations and inadequate resources, and relied on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The claim was transferred to the Administrative Court. The claimant did not attend the hearing or comply fully with earlier procedural directions. The court therefore considered whether there was any sufficient basis to intervene and whether the hearing should be adjourned.

1. Review of the suspension. Under section 41(A)(10) of the Medical Act 1983, the court had power to terminate the suspension or substitute a different period. In exercising that jurisdiction, it was required to give due weight to the knowledge and expertise of the professional regulator, following X v GMC [2001] EWHC Admin 447.
2. The committee had undertaken a detailed and considered assessment before imposing suspension. The claimant did not contend that there was no evidence capable of supporting its conclusions. His disagreement with the factual assessment therefore provided no sufficient basis for judicial intervention. There was likewise no evidential basis for alleging that political considerations had influenced the decision, and no reason to suppose that relevant resource issues had been ignored.
3. Article 3. The submission that suspending a doctor because he was believed not to meet the required professional standard constituted inhuman or degrading treatment was hopeless. The suspension did not engage Article 3 on the facts presented.
4. Adjournment. Even had the claimant’s letter seeking an adjournment been before the court when judgment was delivered, the adjournment would have been refused. The claimant had failed to comply with earlier court orders, and the claim had no prospect of success. An adjournment would merely have increased the costs of the litigation and potentially prejudiced the claimant.
5. The court refused to exercise its powers under section 41(A)(10). The defendant was awarded its costs, with summary assessment to take place on notice so that the claimant could make representations.

The claim was commenced in the High Court and transferred to the Administrative Court by District Judge McGrath sitting at Manchester District Registry. The Administrative Court refused relief.