C v Balham Youth Court

A youth court should retain jurisdiction over an indictable offence unless the offence, the circumstances and the offender make it a realistic possibility that a substantial custodial sentence under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 may be required.

For an offender under 15 who is not a persistent offender, the unavailability of a detention and training order does not itself justify committal to the Crown Court. A sentence of less than two years under section 91 will be exceptional. The youth court should give reasons when declining jurisdiction and apply the statutory test rather than treating the availability of custody in the Crown Court as decisive.

C, aged 14, was charged with attempting to rob another 14-year-old of a mobile phone. The Balham Youth Court declined jurisdiction, apparently because its sentencing powers were limited and a custodial sentence was available in the Crown Court. C was committed for trial at the Inner London Crown Court and sought judicial review.

The Administrative Court considered the relationship between sections 24 and 91 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 and the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The central issue was whether the alleged offence was sufficiently serious to make a substantial section 91 custodial sentence a realistic possibility.

1. The application succeeded. The committal was quashed and the case was to return to the Youth Court as soon as possible. A normal order as to costs was made.
2. Section 24(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 requires an offender under 18 charged with an indictable offence to be tried summarily unless the offence is sufficiently serious that, if proved, the court ought to be able to impose a sentence under section 91(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.
3. Section 100(2) of the 2000 Act generally prevents a detention and training order being made against an offender under 15 unless the offender is a persistent offender. That restriction does not, by itself, justify sending the case to the Crown Court so that a shorter custodial sentence can be imposed under section 91.
4. The guidance in R (on the application of D) v Manchester City Youth Court and R (on the application of W) v Thetford Justices, as approved in R v Southampton Youth Court, established that a section 91 sentence of less than two years would ordinarily be appropriate only in exceptional circumstances. Cases involving an offender under 15 who is not eligible for a detention and training order will generally attract a non-custodial sentence.
5. The mobile-phone robbery sentencing guidance in Attorney General's Ref Nos 4 and 7 and the case of Lobban did not displace the established principles governing offenders under 15. The present facts were materially less serious than those in R v Bol Joseph. They did not involve a weapon, night-time offending or comparable violence, and did not make detention for two years or more a realistic possibility.
6. The Youth Court should give reasons when declining jurisdiction. The absence of reasons made it necessary to infer the District Judge's approach from the clerk's notes, but that approach was legally wrong if it treated the availability of custody in the Crown Court as sufficient.