South Shropshire District Council v First Secretary of State

Under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 54A, a planning decision may depart from development plan policies where material considerations indicate that a different result is appropriate. An inspector must recognise any conflict with the development plan, but need not undertake further analysis of outdated policies where the issue argued is whether the proposal complies with current national guidance and other material considerations.

Whether modest rural infill development promotes sustainable development is principally a matter of planning judgment. A court will intervene for perversity only where the decision is one which no reasonable decision-maker could reach. An inspector need not address every point raised orally, particularly where it is speculative and unsupported by evidence, although fuller reasons may be preferable.

The claimant local planning authority refused permission for the demolition of an existing bus depot and garage and the construction of five houses in Stiperstones. The developer appealed, and the Secretary of State’s inspector allowed the appeal after treating the proposal as modest rural infill development consistent with national housing guidance.

The authority applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash the inspector’s decision. It alleged failures to address development plan conflict, the possible loss of bus services, the weight given to an interim housing policy, the basis for finding a local housing requirement, and the sustainability conclusion.

1. The application was dismissed. The inspector had expressly recognised that the proposal exceeded the one- or two-dwelling limits in Policies HG4 and STI1. He was entitled to conclude that national guidance supported the proposal and that other material considerations outweighed the development plan conflict. This was consistent with section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
2. The alleged termination of the bus service was raised orally and was unsupported by evidence. The inspector referred to the relocation of the depot and was not required to deal with every speculative point raised at the hearing. Even if fuller reasoning would have been preferable, there was no evidential basis for a different conclusion.
3. The inspector was entitled to give limited weight to the claimant’s Interim Housing Policy because it had not been publicly consulted upon. He adequately explained that the policy adopted a radical interpretation of national guidance and exceeded its requirements by excluding modest market housing infill in settlements such as Stiperstones. The decision had to be read as a whole.
4. The reference to satisfying a local requirement was properly understood as reflecting the policy objective of providing homes for local people. It did not refer to affordable housing, and no specific quantification of local need was required for that general planning judgment.
5. The conclusion that the site was acceptable for modest infill development was not irrational. The inspector considered the village’s facilities, public transport, the relocation of the depot, road safety and environmental benefits. The high threshold for a perversity challenge was not met.
6. The first defendant’s costs were summarily assessed at £5,563.75. The second defendant was awarded only its assessed costs relating to the witness statements. Leave to appeal was refused.

The judgment was a first-instance application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 challenging a decision of a Secretary of State’s planning inspector. Leave to appeal was refused.