London Borough of Bromley, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State for Transport

In determining whether inappropriate development in the Green Belt is justified by very special circumstances, the decision-maker must consider both the present availability of alternative sites and their potential availability in the future. Exceptional cases may justify attention being confined to the immediate present, but such cases will be rare.

The weight to be given to present non-availability and uncertain future potential is a matter of planning judgment. A decision letter must give proper, adequate and intelligible reasons, but need not give reasons for reasons. Personal occupancy conditions for substantial permanent buildings are exceptional; where the planning benefits are not personal to the proposed occupier, refusing such a condition may be lawful.

The claimant sought judicial review under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288, of the Secretaries of State’s decision to grant planning permission for a substantial aircraft hangar at Biggin Hill Airport. The development was accepted to be inappropriate development in the metropolitan Green Belt.

The Inspector considered whether very special circumstances existed, focusing on the operational need of the proposed occupier and the availability of alternative sites within the airport. He recommended refusal because uncertainty about the future of a runway and the airport’s development prevented the alternative-location issue from being established beyond reasonable doubt. The Secretaries of State disagreed and granted permission. The claimant challenged their treatment of alternative sites, their reasons, and their refusal to impose a condition making the permission personal to Jet Aviation.

1. The application was dismissed. The Secretaries of State had not erred in law in granting permission for inappropriate Green Belt development.
2. The relevant approach was that operational need could contribute to very special circumstances only where there was no other acceptable and practicable location within the operational areas of the airport. Site D was not a realistic alternative because it was outside the applicant’s ownership and control, and there was no evidence that this would change in the near future. The decision-makers were entitled to rely on the Inspector’s assessment and were not required to give reasons for declining to draw further inferences from confidential negotiations.
3. Sites F and G depended on the continued operation of runway 11/29. The future of that runway and the airport’s wider role was uncertain. That future potential was a material consideration. The decision letter, read as a whole and in a common-sense manner, showed that the Secretaries of State had considered it but attached greater weight to the current absence of a suitable alternative site. That was a planning judgment open to them. They were not required to explain why they gave greater weight to one consideration than another, since they were not required to give reasons for reasons.
4. The refusal to make the permission personal to Jet Aviation was also lawful. Personal or commercial occupancy conditions for substantial permanent buildings are exceptional. The Secretaries of State were entitled to consider that the planning benefits included the provision of an FBO and improvement of the airport, matters not personal to Jet Aviation. If Jet Aviation did not occupy the hangar, another operator could provide the required service. The condition was therefore reasonably regarded as unjustified.
5. Permission to appeal was refused. The challenge raised no compelling reason and had no reasonable prospect of success.

First-instance judicial review application. The judgment does not state any earlier appellate decision.