Morgan, R (on the application of) v Justices of Dyfed Powys Magistrates' Court

Under section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897, once the police authority to retain lawfully seized property has ended, the person from whom it was taken is entitled to possession unless another person claims a superior entitlement. That person need not prove the property’s true source or establish title in the ordinary civil-law sense. Where there is no competing claimant, the magistrates may treat the person entitled to possession as the person appearing to be the owner. A public authority cannot retain or expropriate property without statutory authority. Judicial review may proceed despite an alternative case-stated procedure where justice is served and no party is prejudiced.

Money was seized by the police in 1983 during an investigation and was later the subject of a confiscation order against the claimant’s nephew. The Court of Appeal quashed that order because there was no clear evidence that the money was the proceeds of crime. The police retained the money. After related civil proceedings were struck out, they applied under section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 for directions concerning its disposal.

The magistrates ordered payment into central funds, less an amount for costs. The claimant sought judicial review, contending that the magistrates had applied the wrong test, failed to give effect to the earlier Court of Appeal decision, and wrongly rejected evidence. The central issue was whether the claimant had to prove true ownership or the source of the money before an order for its return could be made.

1. Judicial review was appropriate. Although an appeal by way of case stated was available, the court exercised its discretion to proceed by judicial review. The case-stated time limit had expired and could not be extended, and no party had suffered prejudice (para [5]).
2. The governing principle. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Webb v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2000] QB 427 established that a public authority cannot retain property after its statutory power of retention has ended. It cannot achieve confiscation by resisting a claim for return on the basis that the property may represent the proceeds of crime, where the relevant statutory confiscation machinery has not been used (paras [7]-[10]).
3. Application under section 1(1). The claimant had possession of the money when it was seized, the money was found on his property, and no other person claimed it. His entitlement to possession therefore revived when the police authority to retain it ended. For the purposes of section 1(1), he was the person appearing to the magistrates to be the owner. The magistrates erred by investigating how the claimant or his brother had acquired the money and by treating doubts about their financial circumstances as relevant. They should have ordered its return (paras [11]-[13]).
4. Residual protection and relief. The conclusion did not determine absolute ownership. Section 1(2) preserved a right for a person claiming ownership to bring proceedings within six months against the person in possession. The magistrates’ decision was quashed, and the court declared that the capital sum and accrued interest should be returned to John Rhys Morgan. Remittal was unnecessary because only that order was legally available (paras [11], [15]).
5. The court declined to consider the other grounds because the matter was determined by Webb (para [20]).

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The magistrates’ order of 17 May 2002 was quashed, and the money and accrued interest were ordered to be returned by declaration.