Spencer v Sillitoe & Anor

Particulars of claim must be confined to matters relevant to the pleaded cause of action and issues for trial. Lengthy background, collateral allegations and personal attacks may be struck out where they are irrelevant, prolix or oppressive, even if the claimant relies on them to establish motive or character. In defamation proceedings, a claimant’s good reputation is presumed, so disclosure should not become an extended biography. The consent principle arising from contractual disciplinary procedures is fact-sensitive. It may protect repetition of allegations made during properly commenced disciplinary proceedings, but the court should not apply it summarily where the commencement of the procedure, the investigator’s independence or possible malicious initiation are disputed.

The claimant brought two actions against his former employer, Fujitsu Services Ltd, and a former employee. The first was a libel claim concerning allegations that he had threatened to sabotage the company’s contracts. The second was a contract and confidence claim arising from the same employment dispute.

The defendants applied to strike out substantial parts of the pleadings as irrelevant, prolix, embarrassing and vexatious, and sought a reduced disclosure exercise. In the libel action they also relied on the principle in Friend v Civil Aviation Authority, said to prevent claims concerning communications made during contractual disciplinary proceedings. The issues were whether the collateral employment history should remain, and whether the August 2000 communications fell within that principle at the interlocutory stage.

1. The applications were granted in part. Allegations concerning the Pathway project, alleged personal motives, irrelevant attacks on individuals and other collateral material were struck out from both actions. The material would complicate and prolong the trial without assisting determination of the pleaded claims.

2. In the libel action, the relevant issues were substantially whether the alleged threats had been made, whether the defence of justification was established, and whether any qualified privilege was defeated by malice. The wider history was not relevant to those issues because no publication by Mr Christou, or transmission by him of the alleged motive, was pleaded.

3. The court accepted the principle identified in Friend v Civil Aviation Authority (unreported, 29 January 1998): a person who invokes contractual disciplinary procedures may be taken to consent to repetition of the allegation during and for the purposes of those proceedings. The principle is based on consent rather than privilege and turns on the particular facts.

4. The principle could not safely dispose of the claims concerning the 15 and 24 August publications at this stage. It was disputed when the formal investigation began, whether the investigator had adequate independence, and whether the complaint had been maliciously manufactured. The pleadings concerning those publications therefore remained.

5. The claimant was directed to serve a substantially reduced list of documents confined to pleaded issues. No order was required for the return of the defendants’ documents, in view of the claimant’s assurance.