Director of Public Prosecutions v Conroy

When deciding whether special reasons justify withholding a driving disqualification, the court must assess the whole circumstances directly connected with the offence. A short distance is not determinative. The manner of driving, speed, location, road and traffic conditions, risk to other road users, the vehicle’s condition, the driver’s intention to continue and the reason for driving may all be relevant. An appellate court may intervene where no reasonable bench, properly directed, could have reached the decision.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against the decision of the Crewe Justices on 4 February 2003. The respondent had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol, contrary to section 5(5)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The Justices found special reasons for not disqualifying him, relying principally on the short distance driven and the condition of his passenger.

The central questions were whether it was wrong in law to find special reasons and whether any reasonable bench, properly directing itself, could have reached that conclusion.

1. Appeal allowed. The respondent drove for about one mile, intended to drive a further 200 yards, exceeded the speed limit, drove erratically and travelled through a town centre where pedestrians were present. Those circumstances outweighed the shortness of the distance and meant that the only conclusion open on a proper exercise of discretion was that no special reasons existed.

2. The matters identified in Chatters and Burke [1986] 3 All ER 168 were relevant, including how and where the vehicle was driven, its condition, the driver’s intention to continue, road and traffic conditions, the possibility of danger to other road users and the reason for driving.

3. The governing concept of special reasons requires a mitigating or extenuating circumstance which is not a defence, is directly connected with the offence and is properly considered when imposing punishment, as stated in Wickens 42 Cr App R 236. The court should be slow to interfere with a properly directed decision, but intervention was justified because no reasonable bench could properly have found special reasons on these facts.

4. The matter was remitted to the Crewe Justices to determine the appropriate period of disqualification. The respondent was ordered to pay £500 towards the appellant’s costs.

1. Crewe Justices: On 4 February 2003, convicted the respondent under section 5(5)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and found special reasons for not disqualifying him.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the prosecution appeal and remitted the matter to the Justices to determine the appropriate period of disqualification.