E, R (on the application of) v Leeds Youth Court Justices & Anor

Where a person under 15 cannot receive a detention and training order because the statutory persistence requirement is not met, the court should not ordinarily use Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 91(3), to impose an alternative custodial sentence. Section 91(3) may be used only in rare circumstances where, disregarding the statutory restraints, a sentence approaching or exceeding two years would have been appropriate. Otherwise, the accused should be tried summarily in the Youth Court, which is the appropriate forum for persons of the relevant age.

The 13-year-old claimant was charged with robbery arising from an alleged incident shortly after his thirteenth birthday. A District Judge sitting in the Leeds Youth Court committed him for trial in the Crown Court under section 24(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, concluding that, if convicted, it ought to be possible to sentence him under section 91(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

The claimant sought judicial review of that decision and an order requiring the Youth Court to accept jurisdiction. The central issue was whether the statutory scheme permitted committal to the Crown Court where a detention and training order would not ordinarily be available.

1. The claim succeeded. The decision committing the claimant for Crown Court trial was quashed. The case was remitted to the Youth Court with a direction that it proceed with the summary trial.
2. Section 24(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 permits committal where the offence is within section 91(1) or (2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 and the court considers that, if the accused is convicted, it ought to be possible to sentence under section 91(3).
3. That power must be read with section 100 of the 2000 Act. Section 100(1) makes a detention and training order the ordinary form of detention for an offender under 18. Under section 100(2), such an order cannot ordinarily be made for an offender under 15 unless the offender is a persistent offender. It was not contended that the claimant was persistent.
4. The statutory scheme therefore indicates that, where a detention and training order cannot be made, custodial sentencing is generally inappropriate. The Crown Court route under section 91(3) should not be used simply to circumvent that restriction. It remains available only in rare circumstances where, free from the statutory constraints, a sentence of under two years would not have been appropriate and a sentence approaching or exceeding two years would have been justified.
5. On the alleged facts, even apart from the statutory restraints, a sentence exceeding two years, or anything approaching two years, could not have been appropriate. The only lawful course was summary trial in the Youth Court. The court also reaffirmed the importance of children of the appropriate age being tried in that specialist forum.
6. The claimant's costs were ordered to be paid out of public funds, with detailed assessment. The anonymity order made when permission was granted was noted.

The District Judge sitting in the Leeds Youth Court committed the claimant for trial in the Crown Court under section 24(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. The Administrative Court quashed that decision and directed the Youth Court to proceed summarily.