Oduro v Time-Life Entertainment Group Ltd

On an application for a ruling on meaning or strike out in a libel claim, the judge must assess the words in their publication context and identify the range of meanings reasonably available to the ordinary reasonable reader. A pleaded meaning should be withdrawn only where it is incapable of arising and a properly directed jury could not reasonably adopt it.

The court must avoid strained, forced or excessively analytical interpretations. Where competing meanings depend on evaluating disputed or contextual evidence, the issue ordinarily remains for the jury. A meaning that the claimant grossly exaggerated the closeness of a friendship may be defamatory in the particular context, while an allegation of lying about being a friend or best friend may require an unreasonable reading and therefore be unavailable.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning passages in a book about Stephen Lawrence and his friendship with Duwayne Brooks. He pleaded meanings alleging that he had exposed Stephen to danger, lacked Stephen’s trust, was not Stephen’s real friend, behaved aggressively and selfishly, was racist and had lied or exaggerated the closeness of his friendship with Stephen.

The defendant applied under CPR Parts 3 and 53 to strike out the claim or obtain rulings that the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded meanings or were not defamatory. The central issues were the permissible meanings of the passages and whether any issue could properly be withdrawn from a jury.

1. Meaning. The court applied the approach summarised in Gillick v Brook Advisory Centre [2001] EWCA Civ 1263. The judge must evaluate the words and delimit the range of meanings reasonably available, applying his own judgment and rejecting meanings requiring a strained, forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation.
2. The words must be read as part of the publication and in their context, from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable reader reading the publication once. The reader is fair-minded, possesses ordinary worldly knowledge, is neither unduly naive nor suspicious, and may read between the lines and engage in loose thinking. The court also applied the broader approach to reputation and context explained in Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008.
3. The meanings alleging that the claimant had put Stephen in danger, had lost Stephen’s trust, and was aggressive and selfish were capable of arising. Their resolution involved evaluation of the evidence and context, which was for the jury. The court therefore declined to withdraw them.
4. The passages were capable of conveying that the claimant’s status as Stephen’s real friend was wrongly or undeservedly assessed by Stephen’s parents. They were also capable of conveying that he had grossly exaggerated the closeness of the relationship. In the circumstances surrounding discussion of Stephen Lawrence’s life, the latter meaning was capable of being defamatory.
5. The passages were not capable of meaning that the claimant had lied about being Stephen’s friend. Nor were they capable of meaning that he had lied about being Stephen’s best friend. Such a conclusion would assume an unduly suspicious and unreasonable reader. The pleaded racist meaning was, however, capable of arising.
6. Following Alexander v Arts Council of Wales [2001] EWCA 514; [2001] 1 WLR 1840, an issue depending on evaluation of evidence may be withdrawn only where a properly directed jury could not properly reach the necessary conclusion. The defendant’s application was consequently allowed only to the limited extent reflected in the revised meanings set out by the court; the remaining issues were left for trial.