Knight v Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors

For the two-year limitation period for contribution under Limitation Act 1980, the relevant date is the first date on which the right to contribution accrues. Where parties reach a firm settlement agreement which does not depend on a later consent order, time runs from the agreement. A final consent order may be capable of being described as a judgment for section 10(3), but that does not postpone the limitation period where liability has already arisen by agreement. The statutory distinction is between cases in which liability is imposed by a court or arbitrator and cases in which the amount payable is agreed.

The claimant, a consultant orthopaedic surgeon, sought an indemnity concerning his settlement of a former patient’s negligence claim. He applied to amend his pleadings, including by adding an alternative contractual claim against the first defendant. The defendants sought a preliminary determination of whether the contribution claim was barred by the two-year limitation period under section 10 of the Limitation Act 1980.

The settlement agreement was reached on 24 October 2000. A consent order followed on 8 November 2000, and the contribution claim was issued on 1 November 2002. The central issue was whether time ran from the agreement or from the consent order. The court also considered whether the claim for a declaration against the second defendants disclosed reasonable grounds.

1. Permission was granted to amend the Particulars of Claim. The proposed alternative contractual claim against the first defendant could properly be pleaded.

2. The claim against the second defendants disclosed no reasonable grounds. It was struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a). A declaration concerning the scope of the NHS indemnity would give no practical advantage, since the indemnity issue would be considered in the present action and the second defendants would continue handling the litigation for the first defendant.

3. Under section 10 of the Limitation Act 1980, subsections (3) and (4) deal separately with cases in which liability is imposed by judgment or arbitration and cases in which compensation is agreed. The words referring to the person becoming entitled to contribution and to the earliest date on which the amount is agreed indicate that the relevant date is the first moment when the right accrues.

4. The consent order was final and could properly be described as a judgment for section 10(3), despite its being labelled an order. The label is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the parties had made a firm settlement agreement which did not require a consent order before taking effect. The relevant date was therefore 24 October 2000, when the agreement was reached, rather than 8 November 2000, when the consent order was made.

5. The preliminary issue was determined accordingly. The court invited submissions on the form of the consequential orders.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.