W, R (on the application of) v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council

A local social services authority’s duty under Mental Health Act 1983, section 117, arises when the statutory conditions are met. In a contested conditional-discharge case, the authority is not required to put a complete after-care plan in place before the tribunal decides whether to discharge the patient. Once the tribunal has directed conditional discharge, the authority must use reasonable or best endeavours to make the arrangements required by the tribunal within a reasonable time. Professional judgments about suitable accommodation are reviewable only for legality, rationality, relevance and proper professional care. A reasonable refusal to approve accommodation, accompanied by genuine efforts to identify alternatives, does not breach section 117. The domestic tort of false imprisonment requires imprisonment unlawful under domestic law; an infringement of Article 5 is not itself that tort.

The claimant was detained under a hospital order and restriction order under the Mental Health Act 1983. On 9 July 2001 a Mental Health Review Tribunal directed his conditional discharge, subject to psychiatric treatment, social supervision and residence in suitable accommodation approved by the responsible psychiatrist and social worker.

The claimant alleged that the defendant local social services authority unreasonably refused to approve his preferred hostel, failed to arrange the required after-care and thereby prolonged his detention. He claimed damages for false imprisonment and under the Human Rights Act 1998. The court tried liability only. The central issues were the timing and content of the section 117 duty, the effect of the authority’s professional judgment, the domestic tort, and statutory immunities.

1. Section 117 duty. On the natural meaning of section 117(1) and (2), the statutory duty applies where the patient has been detained under one of the specified provisions, ceases to be detained and leaves hospital. An unconditional discharge may satisfy the second condition even if the patient remains in hospital, but the legal duty to provide after-care does not generally arise before those statutory conditions are met. The practical difficulties of requiring authorities to anticipate contested tribunal decisions support that construction (paras [32]-[35]).
2. In a contested case, R v Ealing District Health Authority, ex parte Fox [1993] 1 WLR 373 and R v Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex parte Hall [2000] 1 WLR 1323 do not establish a duty to put after-care arrangements in place before the tribunal has decided the case. The effect of R (K) v Camden and Islington Health Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 240, [2002] QB 198 is that, once the tribunal has stipulated conditions, the authority must normally use reasonable endeavours to fulfil them before actual discharge. Where appropriate, a matter may be returned to the tribunal (paras [36]-[43]).
3. The named social worker was required to exercise professional judgment on the suitability of accommodation. Her decision could not be substituted by the court merely because another professional disagreed. It had to be made honestly, rationally, with regard only to relevant considerations and with reasonable professional care. Her objections to Westfield House were reasoned and rational, and the authority investigated alternatives. It therefore complied with section 117 and did not deliberately frustrate the tribunal’s decision (paras [45]-[49]).
4. The domestic tort of false imprisonment requires imprisonment without lawful authority under domestic law. The Human Rights Act 1998 does not extend the tort to every infringement of Article 5.1. Convention damages are governed by the Convention and sections 6 and 8 of that Act. The claim for false imprisonment therefore failed (paras [26]-[31]).
5. A breach of section 117 does not itself create a damages claim for breach of statutory duty: Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978. A breach which causes or prolongs detention may, subject to section 139(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983, infringe Article 5.1 and engage sections 6 and 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, a reasonable authority that has complied with its domestic duties has no damages liability on that basis (paras [50]-[53]).
6. Section 139(1) applies to damages claims brought in judicial review proceedings and is not confined to positive acts. The judge nevertheless indicated that, if liability for an unlawful Article 5.1 infringement had been established, section 139(1) would probably have to be read down so as not to defeat the Convention right to compensation under Article 5.5 (paras [54]-[56]). The claim was dismissed (para [58]).