Forbes v London Borough of Lambeth

Under the introductory-tenancy scheme, the notice must state the reasons for the landlord’s extant decision to seek possession. If a review reverses that decision, the original notice cannot later support proceedings based on a new decision. A council may instead confirm the decision and suspend or defer its implementation, but the wording must make that outcome clear. Where the reasons for seeking possession materially change, the tenant must have an opportunity for a further review. That safeguard is necessary to maintain compatibility with Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. A possession claim brought without a notice corresponding to the relevant decision cannot succeed.

The Council granted the claimant an introductory tenancy under Part V of the Housing Act 1996. Following allegations of drug dealing and immoral use of the premises, it served a notice of proceedings and the claimant requested a review.

The Council’s review letter stated that it had decided not to proceed with terminating the tenancy, while warning of future consequences. Months later, after further complaints, the Council issued possession proceedings relying on the original notice. The county court rejected the claimant’s jurisdictional argument but adjourned the proceedings to permit judicial review.

The High Court considered the appeal and the related judicial review application. The central questions were whether the review letter confirmed or reversed the original decision, and whether the original notice could support proceedings based on the later complaints.

1. Appeal allowed. The county court’s order was varied. The possession proceedings were dismissed, and possession was refused.
2. Section 128(3) of the Housing Act 1996 requires the notice to state the reasons for the landlord’s decision to apply for possession. The relevant decision is the extant decision to take the proceedings before the court. Where there have been successive decisions, the court must identify which decision the notice supports.
3. The review letter naturally meant that the Council had decided not to proceed with terminating the tenancy. It did not confirm the original decision and suspend its implementation, as the letter in Stone v Cardiff City Council [2002] EWCA Civ 298 had done. No express words of withdrawal or reversal were required. The original decision was therefore reversed or quashed, leaving no extant decision to take proceedings until the later decision in March 2001.
4. The March decision relied on continuing complaints about disturbance caused by visitors. Those reasons were materially different from the original allegations of drug dealing and immoral use. The original notice consequently did not state the reasons for the relevant decision.
5. The same conclusion followed from section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The compatibility of the statutory scheme with Articles 6 and 8 depended on the combination of the local authority review and judicial review identified in R. v. Bracknell Forest Borough Council, ex p. McLellan [2001] EWCA Civ 1510. A tenant must have an opportunity to challenge both the allegations and the reasonableness of seeking possession. Where the reasons change, a further review opportunity is required.
6. The Council could have preserved its position by clearly confirming the original decision and suspending or deferring proceedings. It had not done so. The judicial review application was dismissed because the civil appeal provided the necessary relief; permission to appeal was refused.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the tenant’s appeal from the county court’s adjournment decision, refused possession and dismissed the possession proceedings. The related judicial review application was dismissed because the civil appeal provided the necessary relief.
• Bow County Court: Mr Recorder Atkins rejected the argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant possession, but adjourned the proceedings to allow an application for judicial review.