Marney, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport Environment and the Regions & Anor

An inspector determining a planning appeal need not address every point raised, provided the principal points are identified and dealt with. A procedural fairness complaint will fail where the issue was sufficiently raised at the inquiry, or where the answer adopted was an obvious matter of common sense. An inspector may assess the position on the ground and is not required to determine hypothetical alternative uses which the evidence does not show the claimant intends to pursue. A fundamental conflict with Green Belt policy may independently justify refusal, with landscape harm providing an additional reason.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s decision letter dismissing his appeals against an enforcement notice and the refusal of planning permission. The enforcement notice concerned residential caravans and other structures at a poultry site in the Green Belt, within the Surrey Hills area of outstanding natural beauty. The claimant argued that the inspector had failed to address issues concerning water, electricity, emergencies, rotational husbandry and the possible agricultural use of a caravan.

The section 288 challenge and the application for permission to appeal under section 289 were heard together. The central issues were whether the inspector had acted unfairly or failed to take material considerations into account, and whether the enforcement notice was excessive.

1. Outcome. The application under section 288 and the application for permission to appeal under section 289 were dismissed. The claimant was ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs, summarily assessed at £7,126.
2. The inspector had not acted unfairly by considering whether water pipes could be buried or lagged. The issue had been raised in the evidence and cross-examination, and the claimant had an opportunity to respond. The inspector was also entitled to use common sense in concluding that burying or lagging pipes would prevent freezing. The case of H Sabey & Co Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and Others (1978) 245 EG page 397 was distinguishable because it concerned a highly technical issue raised on a slender evidential basis.
3. The proposed rotational system of husbandry did not make the inspector’s solution impractical. The system involved discrete paddocks and did not prevent pipes being buried to a suitable point with flexible, lagged connections.
4. The inspector had adequately addressed the possibility of component failure. A temperature-controlled alarm would respond to such a failure, and nearby settlements provided sufficiently prompt access. An inspector is not required to address every point raised, only the principal points. The storm at the claimant’s former farm was not a principal plank of the case and did not require separate treatment.
5. The argument that the residential caravan might instead be used for agricultural purposes was hypothetical. The inspector was entitled to consider the actual position, namely that the caravan was occupied as the claimant’s home. The enforcement notice, as varied, required removal of caravans used for residential accommodation and did not prevent a caravan being brought onto the land for genuine agricultural use.
6. The inspector’s conclusion that the development conflicted fundamentally with Green Belt policy independently justified refusal of planning permission. The harm to the Surrey Hills area of outstanding natural beauty was an additional reason. The result would have been the same even if the landscape objection had been reduced.
7. The court had power to order disclosure of an inspector’s notes where necessary in the interests of justice, but refused further disclosure because the application was made too late and the notes were unnecessary to resolve the critical issues.

The judgment records that Buxton LJ refused an application for permission to appeal concerning disclosure of the inspector’s notes on 6 December. The present court then dismissed the section 288 application and refused permission under section 289.