Telford and Wrekin, R (on the application of) v Shrewsbury Crown Court

Costs on an appeal from a licensing decision remain discretionary. Costs do not follow automatically merely because the authority loses. The court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the appellant’s financial prejudice and the need to encourage public authorities to make and maintain honest, reasonable and apparently sound decisions in the public interest.

An authority acts on a medical assessment, rather than under an unlawful blanket policy, where it considers individual medical evidence and receives advice that the particular driver should not be licensed. A costs decision based on an unfounded finding of arbitrary action is materially misdirected and may be quashed.

The Council refused to renew a taxi driver’s licence after medical advice indicated that his insulin-dependent diabetes made him unsuitable to drive a taxi. The magistrates upheld the refusal. After discovering that relevant DVLA guidance was out of date and obtaining further medical evidence, the Council agreed that the appeal should succeed.

The Shrewsbury Crown Court nevertheless ordered the Council to pay the driver’s costs, considering that it had adopted an arbitrary blanket approach. The Council sought judicial review of that costs decision. The central issue was whether the Recorder had materially misdirected himself in finding that the Council had acted arbitrarily.

1. The application was allowed. The Crown Court’s costs order was quashed. There was no order as to costs.
2. Under [2000] COD 338, the power to award costs on an appeal from an administrative licensing decision is discretionary. Costs may follow the event, but they need not do so merely because the appellant succeeds. Relevant considerations include the appellant’s financial prejudice and the need to encourage public authorities to make and stand by honest, reasonable and apparently sound decisions made in the public interest.
3. The court should interfere with a costs decision only exceptionally, where the decision falls outside the range of reasonable responses or the decision-maker has materially misdirected himself on fact or law.
4. The Recorder’s conclusion that the Council had imposed a blanket ban was unfounded. The Council had acted on medical advice concerning the particular driver, had no contrary medical evidence before it or the magistrates, and had relied on DVLA guidance which appeared to support that approach at the time.
5. There is a material distinction between an inflexible policy that every insulin-dependent taxi driver must be refused a licence and a decision reached after considering medical advice that the particular driver should not be licensed. The Council acted reasonably when it changed its position after receiving new information and medical evidence.
6. The Recorder’s costs decision was therefore tainted by a significant misdirection. The decision was quashed, without the court itself redetermining the costs issue.

1. Shrewsbury Crown Court: ordered the Council to pay the interested party’s costs after the licensing appeal was allowed by consent.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): quashed the Crown Court’s costs decision on judicial review.