Her Majesty's Attorney General v Mahon

For a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the court must assess the litigant’s conduct by examining the whole history of the litigation. It is not confined to whether individual pleadings disclose an arguable cause of action. Habitual and persistent litigation is vexatious where the litigant continues proceedings or applications after earlier failures, repeats substantially the same complaints, challenges adverse decisions without rational grounds, or uses proceedings to harass others. The court should rely on the conclusions reached in the underlying proceedings rather than reopening their merits. Statutory rights of appeal remain legitimate, but they do not justify collateral or abusive litigation. Where the statutory criteria are satisfied, the court has a discretion to impose restrictions on further civil proceedings.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against Kevin Mahon. Since September 2000 he had instituted 31 actions, principally concerning a refused hackney carriage licence, benefits, and disputes with neighbours. The proceedings had been unsuccessful or struck out, and he had made numerous unsuccessful applications and appeals. The central issue was whether he had habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious civil proceedings or made vexatious applications.

1. The court granted the application and made a civil proceedings order for 12 years. The order prohibited Mr Mahon from instituting or continuing civil proceedings, or making applications in civil proceedings, without the leave of the High Court.
2. Section 42 requires the court to consider whether the statutory conduct has occurred and, if so, whether to exercise its discretion. The assessment is historical and holistic. Under In re Vernazza [1959] 1 W.L.R. 622, the court may examine the whole history and is not confined to the apparent validity of a pleading. The guidance in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 identifies repeated litigation, repeated reliance on determined causes of action, automatic challenges to adverse decisions, and disregard of court orders as characteristic features.
3. The court must not reconsider the merits of the underlying proceedings. It may rely on the conclusions reached by the judges who determined them, consistently with Attorney General v Jones [1990] 1 W.L.R. 859.
4. Mr Mahon’s statutory rights of appeal did not make the subsequent collateral claims legitimate. The court distinguished the exercise of a statutory appeal from the largely unmeritorious and repetitive proceedings brought after the original disputes had been determined.
5. The three strands of litigation independently demonstrated vexatious conduct. The evidence concerning the neighbours showed that proceedings were being used deliberately to cause expense and harassment. The statutory criteria were therefore clearly fulfilled. The court also noted that section 42 orders are compatible with the Convention rights, following Ebert v Official Receiver [2001] EWCA Civ 340.
6. In general observations, the court endorsed the practical use of short-term protective orders discussed in Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113. Orders dismissing obviously meritless proceedings should record that fact, assisting any later section 42 application. A unilateral stay may also be appropriate where earlier costs orders remain unsatisfied.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.