Perotti v Iliffes Booth Bennett (A Firm) & Ors

Repeated litigation may constitute an abuse of process even where the parties to the later proceedings were not parties to the earlier proceedings. The court may restrain relitigation where it would be manifestly unfair or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

On a summary judgment application, the court must assess whether the claim has a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. A bare denial of evidence does not require a trial. A litigant in person is entitled to reasonable assistance, but that assistance does not permit wide-ranging unpleaded allegations or disregard of procedural rules.

The claimant sued three firms or individuals who had advised or represented him in earlier litigation concerning the administration of his late uncle’s estate. He alleged failures to advise on several causes of action, including estate remuneration, investment losses, costs consequences, recovery of personal effects, the joinder of an administrator, and an interlocutory appeal.

The defendants applied to strike out the claim as disclosing no reasonable grounds or as an abuse of process. Alternatively, they sought summary judgment on the basis that the claim had no real prospect of success. The central issues were whether the matters had already been adjudicated or could and should have been raised earlier, and whether the pleaded claims had any realistic prospect of succeeding.

1. Abuse of process. The principles in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2003] 3 WLR 841 applied. Although the defendants were not parties to the earlier proceedings, relitigation would be an abuse because it would be manifestly unfair and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
2. The claimant had already had ample opportunities to advance the relevant issues. The present proceedings sought to reopen matters considered in earlier judgments, including the alleged investment-loss claim and complaints about legal advice. Allowing the proceedings to continue would impose substantial and unjustified burdens on the defendants and the court.
3. Summary judgment. Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 24, the question was whether the claim had a realistic prospect of success, not merely a fanciful one. A party’s denial of evidence did not require the court to accept that denial or proceed to trial. The court could balance the evidence, while avoiding a mini-trial, and dismiss a claim which plainly had no prospect of success. The approach in Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 and National Westminster Bank v Daniel [1993] 1 WLR 1453 was applied.
4. The claim against the first defendants failed independently because the retainer was brief and was terminated before the alleged work could properly be undertaken. The claims against the second and third defendants also had no realistic prospect of success. The evidence showed that the issues had been considered and that advice to pursue settlement was sound.
5. Under section 21 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, an attorney who takes the grant is deemed to be an executor for all purposes. Such an attorney cannot charge for professional time in the absence of a charging clause or an order of the court. The court held that this point would not have altered the earlier decisions or created a viable claim against the defendants.
6. The Particulars of Claim were struck out as an abuse of process. Alternatively, summary judgment was entered for the defendants because the claim had no real prospect of success.

The judgment is a first-instance decision. The judgment describes earlier proceedings and appeals concerning the estate litigation, but no appeal from this decision is stated.