Hossein, R (on the application of) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal

An Immigration Appeal Tribunal is entitled to begin processing the first application for leave to appeal that it receives. It is not required to wait for the expiry of the time limit, or to consider a later second application, merely because it is lodged by a legal representative. The Tribunal must decide the application before it, including the grounds then available. An applicant remains protected where an unraised ground clearly arises on the face of the Adjudicator’s determination and might affect its validity. Acknowledgment correspondence sent to a representative does not create a legitimate expectation that a different application will be considered.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s refusal of leave to appeal from an Adjudicator’s dismissal of his asylum and human-rights claims. The claimant had submitted an application in person, while his solicitors said that a separate application drafted by counsel had also been faxed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the claimant’s application but had no record of receiving counsel’s application. The central issues were whether the Tribunal was obliged to consider both applications and whether its acknowledgment letter created a legitimate expectation that counsel’s grounds would be considered.

1. Claim dismissed. The Tribunal had no obligation to consider more than one application for leave to appeal. Rule 18 of the 2000 Procedure Rules required an application to be made in the prescribed form with the grounds relied upon. The purpose of the rule was to secure prompt determination and prevent applications being supplemented or delayed by later grounds.
2. The Tribunal was entitled to begin processing the application received in the morning post. It was not required to wait until the time limit expired in case another application or further grounds arrived. That remained so even if the later faxed application had been received but had subsequently been lost. If two applications arrived within a short period, they could properly be put before the Vice President together, but there was no legal obligation to do so.
3. The decision in Robinson protected an applicant where a ground was not expressly raised but clearly arose from the face of the Adjudicator’s determination and might affect its validity. That protection did not require the Tribunal to consider a separate application which it was not obliged to process.
4. The approach in Tanveer Ahmed permitted an Adjudicator to assess the authenticity and weight of documents in the context of the evidence as a whole. The Adjudicator was entitled to reject the alleged summonses and warrants in light of the adverse credibility findings.
5. No legitimate expectation arose that the grounds prepared by the claimant’s representatives would be considered. The only relevant expectation was that the Tribunal would properly consider the application before it, which it had done. In any event, the underlying asylum and human-rights claim had no realistic prospect of success and disclosed no arguable error of law.

The judicial-review claim was dismissed. The defendant was awarded costs on the usual basis, subject to filing the necessary documentation within 14 days.

The judgment describes the following prior decisions:

• Adjudicator: dismissed the claimant’s asylum and human-rights appeal.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: refused leave to appeal and later refused reconsideration under Rule 19 of the 2000 Procedure Rules.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the judicial-review claim.