Aaalamani, R (on the application of) v General Medical Council

A statutory appeal against interim professional restrictions becomes incapable of determination when the restrictions have ceased to exist. The court cannot grant effective relief against conditions no longer in force. Where a later substantive order has replaced or superseded the interim conditions, an appeal against those interim conditions provides no practical benefit. Jurisdiction to challenge the substantive order lies with the appellate body specified by the statutory scheme, not with the court hearing the appeal against the interim order.

Dr Hossain Aaalamani brought three statutory appeals under section 41A(10)(b) of the Medical Act 1983 against Interim Orders Committee decisions dated 18 March, 16 September and 11 December 2002. The first decision imposed supervised-work conditions; the later decisions varied or reviewed them.

The Committee on Professional Performance subsequently found his professional performance seriously deficient and imposed substantive conditions for three years. The interim conditions ceased to apply when that order took effect on 27 February 2003. The claimant also raised disclosure matters and sought an adjournment pending proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.

1. The three statutory appeals were dismissed. The conditions imposed by the Interim Orders Committee had ceased to exist when the Committee on Professional Performance’s substantive order took effect. There was therefore no extant condition against which an appeal could be pursued.
2. The court considered that an appeal would in any event have provided no practical benefit because the substantive conditions imposed by the Committee on Professional Performance governed the claimant’s registration. The court had no jurisdiction to determine an appeal against that substantive order; that matter lay within the jurisdiction of the Privy Council.
3. The appeals were brought under section 41A(10)(b) of the Medical Act 1983. The statutory appeal could not be used to challenge conditions which were no longer in force or to obtain relief against a different order made under the statutory scheme.
4. An adjournment pending a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights was refused. The court observed that domestic appellate remedies ordinarily had to be exhausted before the European Court would consider such a complaint, and that leaving these matters adjourned would potentially hinder rather than assist exhaustion.
5. The two subsidiary disclosure matters raised by the claimant had already been dealt with by Elias J and no longer required determination. The defendant’s costs were summarily assessed at £4,671.80. Permission to appeal was refused because there was no prospect of success.

1. Privy Council: dismissed the claimant’s appeal against the Committee on Professional Performance’s substantive decision; the consequent order was made on 27 February 2003.
2. High Court, Administrative Court: Scott Baker J initially treated the first matter as an application for judicial review and refused permission. A renewed application was later adjourned by a deputy High Court judge.
3. High Court, Administrative Court: Elias J dealt with disclosure applications on 14 January 2003 and made no order as to costs for that hearing.
4. High Court, Administrative Court: the present court dismissed all three statutory appeals.