Moss, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State & Anor

In determining planning appeals concerning gypsy sites, an inspector must assess each application and the individual circumstances of each proposed occupier. A global assessment of the cumulative number of caravans is insufficient where the evidence raises the possibility that fewer sites or units could properly be permitted. Personal circumstances, including children’s education and care of elderly relatives, must be weighed against planning harm, although they do not automatically prevail. Unauthorised occupation is a relevant factor. Article 8 requires a balancing exercise substantially aligned with the assessment of planning merits and personal circumstances.

The claimant challenged, under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the dismissal of eight linked appeals against refusal of planning permission for gypsy plots in Swavesey, Cambridgeshire. Each application sought permission for a mobile home and caravans. The inspector accepted that there was an unmet local need and considered the effects on the countryside, highway safety, personal circumstances, education, family life and the care of elderly relatives.

The central issue was whether the inspector had lawfully considered the individual applications and whether permission could have been granted for some applicants or with fewer caravans.

1. Decision quashed. The inspector’s decision was flawed because it treated the proposals globally and did not properly consider whether one or more individual applications could be allowed, or whether fewer caravans and mobile homes would avoid the identified harm.
2. A decision letter must be read as a whole and construed flexibly rather than as if it were a statute. Here, the dominant concern was the proposed number of caravans and mobile homes. The inspector’s conclusion that the personal circumstances did not justify the number proposed on each site was not compatible with her earlier statement that she had considered personal permissions for particular applicants.
3. The inspector was entitled to take account of the unlawful commencement of the development. That factor affected the weight given to personal circumstances but did not prevent permission from being granted.
4. The inspector had adequately considered the unmet need for gypsy sites. Local need, rather than an abstract national figure, was the relevant practical consideration in assessing provision in the area.
5. The Article 8 assessment was lawful in principle. The interference with home and family life was balanced against the legitimate planning aim of protecting the countryside. The planning assessment of personal circumstances substantially addressed the same considerations.
6. Education was a relevant personal circumstance but did not require separate treatment as determinative. The right to education remained, and the difficulties caused by moving between sites were factors to be weighed in the overall balance.
7. The decision was quashed under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and thereby remitted to the Secretary of State. The claimant was awarded 75 per cent of the costs, subject to detailed assessment.

High Court (Administrative Court): The eight linked planning appeals were dismissed by the inspector. Collins J quashed the decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and remitted the matter to the Secretary of State.