W, R (on the application of) v Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council & Anor

An authority or tribunal deciding whether to cease maintaining a statement of special educational needs must properly understand and have regard to the relevant provisions of the statutory Code of Practice. The question is whether the child’s needs can be met within the resources of the mainstream school, not merely whether they can be met under School Action Plus with external support. The decision-maker must also consider whether the child’s progress would be halted or reversed if the provision specified in the statement, or justified by it, were withdrawn. Failure to address those questions renders the decision unlawful.

The claimant appealed against the decision of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal dated 30 July 2003. The Tribunal had upheld Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council’s decision to cease maintaining a statement of special educational needs for the claimant’s dyslexic daughter.

The Council proposed continuing substantial specialist support through its central services after the child transferred to secondary school. The claimant argued that this demonstrated that her needs could not be met within the resources of the mainstream school and that the Tribunal had misunderstood the relevant provisions of the Code of Practice. The central issues were the proper meaning of the Code’s provisions concerning cessation of a statement and whether the Tribunal had addressed the required questions.

1. Appeal allowed and decision set aside. The Tribunal’s decision of 30 July 2003 was quashed and the matter was remitted for rehearing.
2. The Council and Tribunal were under a statutory duty to have regard to the relevant provisions of the Special Educational Needs Code of Practice issued under Educational Act 1986, section 313. Following Gransden v Secretary of State for the Environment (1985) 54 P&CR p.86, the decision-maker had to understand the Code properly. If departing from it, clear reasons were required.
3. Paragraphs 8:118 and 8:119 of the Code required consideration of whether the child’s needs could in future be met within the resources of the mainstream school. That was not the same question as whether the needs could be met under School Action Plus, which might involve external support from the education authority.
4. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the child’s needs could be met within the mainstream school’s resources was wrong. The Council’s evidence showed that continuing specialist central-service support, broadly comparable to the provision under the statement, remained necessary.
5. Paragraph 8:118 also required the decision-maker always to consider whether the child’s progress would be halted or reversed if the provision specified in the statement, or modified provision justifying its maintenance, were not made. The Tribunal had not posed that question, and the answer on the evidence was plainly affirmative.

The claimant was awarded her costs, including assessment of publicly funded costs.

• Special Educational Needs Tribunal: on 30 July 2003, upheld the Council’s decision to cease maintaining the statement.
• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter for rehearing.