Director of Public Prosecutions v Meaden

Police executing a search warrant may take reasonable and proportionate steps to restrict occupants’ movement where necessary to preserve the effectiveness and integrity of the search. That power may arise from the statutory powers to search premises and persons, together with the ancillary power to use reasonable force. Whether the force or restriction is reasonable depends on the facts, and the police bear a heavy burden of establishing necessity and reasonableness.

There is no general power to arrest merely because a person obstructs a police officer under section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996. Arrest requires the applicable statutory conditions, including the general conditions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated from the decision of the Sussex Justices, who concluded that the defendant had no case to answer on charges of assaulting a police constable and wilfully obstructing another constable.

The charges arose during execution of a search warrant issued under section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and section 15 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The warrant authorised searches of the premises, associated outbuildings and vehicles, and persons found there. The defendant resisted being restricted to rooms which had already been searched.

The central questions were whether officers executing such a warrant could require occupants to remain in particular rooms while other areas were searched, and whether they could prevent occupants from leaving the premises.

1. Appeal allowed and case remitted. The justices had erred in concluding that there was no case to answer. The hearing was to continue in accordance with the judgment.
2. The warrant covered both the premises and persons found there. Section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 gave the officers power to detain persons for the purpose of searching them. Section 117 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 permitted reasonable force, if necessary, in exercising a statutory power.
3. Those powers included reasonable steps taken after entry to make the search effective. Occupants could therefore be restricted to rooms already searched while other rooms were searched, provided that no more force than necessary was used. The officers’ conduct had to be assessed in the context and purpose of the search.
4. The police bore a heavy burden of showing that the force was necessary and reasonable. On the facts, restricting the defendant first to the bathroom and then to the bedroom was reasonable. Both questions stated by the justices were answered affirmatively, subject to the facts of each case.
5. The reliance on Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police v Hepburn was misplaced. That case concerned a warrant limited to premises, whereas the present warrant also covered persons. The court did not question the result in Hepburn, but stated that the observation that obstruction automatically gave rise to a power of arrest was not correct. There was no general power of arrest for obstruction under section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996; arrest depended on the statutory conditions.
6. Articles 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not materially add to the common law principles which determined the appeal.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the DPP’s appeal by way of case stated against the Sussex Justices’ decision of 11 February 2003 and remitted the matter for the justices to continue the hearing.