Jones, R (on the application of) v Sedgemoor District Council

In a planning challenge concerning gypsy accommodation, an inspector must consider relevant general provision needs as well as the applicant’s personal circumstances. Those matters may be intertwined, and the decision letter need not address them in separate compartments if, read as a whole, it demonstrates that the relevant issues were considered.

A decision-maker may assess individual considerations separately before reaching an overall planning balance. Temporary permission is inappropriate where the planning objections concern unacceptable harm to the area and cannot be cured by conditions, or where temporary occupation is likely to become permanent. A court will not interfere with an inspector’s evaluative quality judgment unless there is an error of law.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s dismissal of her appeal against refusal of planning permission for three permanent gypsy mobile homes at Brent Knoll, Somerset. The proposed occupants included the claimant, her son, her daughter and son-in-law, and her elderly mother.

The inspector found serious harm to the countryside and the setting of Brent Knoll. He also considered the family’s educational and medical needs, the availability of alternative sites, the possibility of temporary permission, and Article 8 rights. The claimant advanced five grounds, alleging failures to consider general unmet need, cumulative considerations, temporary permission, local planning policy, and her son’s educational needs.

The application for judicial review was dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused. The claimant was ordered to pay the First Secretary of State’s assessed costs, with liability postponed under section 11 of the Access to Justice Act 1999; detailed assessment of her publicly funded costs was also ordered.

1. General need. The general unmet need for gypsy sites was a material consideration. However, the inspector had addressed it by considering the evidence about alternative private sites and the general difficulty of finding suitable land. General and personal need were necessarily intertwined on the way the case had been presented. Separate treatment might have been preferable, but there had been no material failure to consider general need.
2. Cumulative assessment. A decision letter must be read as a whole. An inspector may deal with individual considerations discretely and state an overall conclusion while doing so. The identification of the main issues necessarily involved an overall planning balance, and the letter did not show that the inspector had failed to consider the matters cumulatively.
3. Temporary permission. Paragraphs 109 and 110 of Circular 11/95 supported refusal where the objections arose from unacceptable effects on the area and could not be overcome by conditions. Temporary permission was also unsuitable where the proposed temporary occupation was likely to lead to permanent establishment of the site. The inspector’s approach disclosed no error of law. The discretion under section 72 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 did not require a different result on these facts.
4. Planning policy. The inspector was entitled to rely on the national policy in paragraph 13 of Circular 1/94 concerning areas where development was severely restricted. The draft local plan did not prevent that approach, particularly because the proposal also conflicted with the policy protecting landscape features of significant local importance.
5. Educational needs. The inspector’s conclusion that the distance from Bridgwater reduced the strength of the educational justification was a quality judgment on the evidence. It was not a finding that access was impractical, and the court had no proper basis to substitute its own assessment.

The claimant applied to the Administrative Court to quash the inspector’s decision dated 2 July 2003 dismissing her planning appeal. The application was dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused.