Hobson & Ors v Cheshire Constabulary

Where police enter premises by the occupier’s consent, the entry is consensual and does not engage the notice requirements applicable to the coercive statutory powers of entry and force under sections 17 and 117 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Consent need not be preceded by disclosure that the police intend to arrest a person, provided it is informed and not obtained covertly or deviously. The statutory requirement to explain the basis of entry applies where coercive powers are exercised, not where an officer proceeds by consent. A separate officer’s refusal of entry may confirm that consent was given only to the officer admitted.

The appellants were convicted by Halton Justices of wilfully obstructing police officers in the execution of their duty, contrary to section 89(2) of the Police Act 1986. The officers had attended the appellants’ home to arrest Steven Hobson. One officer was admitted after saying that he wished to speak to Steven; the other remained outside because consent to her entry was refused.

The appellants argued that the first officer had entered under section 17 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and that the occupier had not given informed consent because he had not been told that an arrest was intended. The appeal by case stated concerned whether the officers were acting in the execution of their duty.

1. Appeal dismissed. The three questions posed by the case stated were answered in the affirmative.
2. The statutory power under section 17 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, together with the power to use reasonable force under section 117, was available to the officers. However, those powers were not used. The officers chose to proceed by consent, and PC Deponeo entered with Eric Hobson’s consent.
3. O’Loughlin v Chief Constable of Essex [1998] 1 WLR 374 concerned statutory entry under section 17 and the use of force under section 117. Its requirement that police announce the basis of coercive entry did not apply to consensual entry.
4. Consent was informed even though PC Deponeo did not expressly say that the purpose was to arrest Steven. The magistrates had found that the officers had not acted covertly or deviously and had made a specific finding of informed consent. That finding was unassailable.
5. The three legally recognised circumstances of entry are entry by consent, entry without consent, and entry without consent by force. Where coercive powers are used, the person concerned must be fully informed of why the power is being exercised. That requirement cannot be imposed on consensual entry.
6. Riley v Director of Public Prosecutions 1991 Criminal Appeal Reports 14 concerned what was said to a suspect at the point of arrest, rather than the lawfulness of entry, and did not assist the appellants.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal by case stated dismissed; the decision of Halton Justices was upheld.
• Halton Justices: The appellants were convicted following trial on charges of wilfully obstructing police officers in the execution of their duty.