M, R (on the application of) v Inner London Crown Court

A parenting order under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 involves judicial evaluation and assessment, not the determination of a criminal charge or a disputed fact requiring a criminal standard of proof. The statutory scheme is compatible with article 8 because it pursues the legitimate objective of preventing youth crime and contains defined preconditions, limits and safeguards. The court must consider all relevant evidence, including family circumstances, and reach a rational judgment. An order may nevertheless be irrational where the evidence shows that it is not desirable to prevent further offending. A compensation order against a parent does not require parental fault or a causal connection with the child’s offence, subject to the statutory exception where payment would be unreasonable.

AM sought judicial review of the Inner London Crown Court’s dismissal of her appeal against a 12-month parenting order and a £30 compensation order imposed after her 13-year-old daughter was convicted of wounding. She argued that the parenting order was irrational and incompatible with articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention challenge concerned the statutory scheme generally and the particular order. The compensation order was challenged only on irrationality grounds.

1. Parenting orders and article 6. The making of a parenting order under sections 8 to 10 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is an exercise of judgment and evaluation. It does not involve a criminal charge or a fact-finding exercise requiring the criminal standard of proof. The court must have strict regard to the statute and the evidence and reach a rational judgment; a separate requirement of “scrupulous fairness” adds nothing.
2. Article 8 compatibility. The statutory regime pursues the legitimate and important objective of preventing juvenile crime. Its provisions are sufficiently certain and contain safeguards concerning triggering conditions, the permissible content and duration of orders, information about family circumstances, explanation of the order, review, variation, discharge and appeal. Applying the proportionality criteria in DeFreitas v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, the measures are rationally connected with their objective and no more intrusive than necessary. The provisions therefore comply with article 8.
3. Particular parenting order. The court applied the irrationality threshold applicable to review of an inferior court’s order. The offence arose from a longstanding neighbour dispute, while the child’s conduct was otherwise exemplary. The pre-sentence report considered AM unsuitable and unreceptive to a parenting order. In those circumstances, no reasonable bench applying the statutory test would have made the order. The parenting order was quashed on irrationality grounds alone.
4. Compensation order. Section 137 of the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 does not require parental fault or a causal connection between the parent’s conduct and the child’s offence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a 13-year-old’s finances may be treated as dependent on the parent. The order was not irrational because no special circumstances made payment unreasonable. The application concerning the compensation order failed.

• Inner London Crown Court: on 11 March 2002 dismissed AM’s appeal against the parenting and compensation orders.
• High Court (Administrative Court): quashed the parenting order for irrationality alone and dismissed the challenge to the compensation order. The statutory provisions were held compatible with the Convention.