Attorney General v Alexander

Under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the High Court may restrain a person from instituting or continuing civil proceedings, or making applications in civil proceedings, where the person has acted habitually and persistently, without reasonable ground, and vexatiously. Repetition need not extend over a lengthy period. Relevant indicators include relitigating decided issues, automatically challenging adverse decisions, ignoring court orders, and pursuing proceedings which lack a discernible legal basis or impose disproportionate inconvenience and expense. Applications for permission to appeal in proceedings before the Court of Appeal may fall within section 42(1)(b). The court must balance the citizen’s right to invoke the civil courts against the protection of other litigants and the proper use of judicial resources. A civil proceedings order may be made without limitation of time where the evidence warrants it.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against Anthony Alexander. The application relied on ten proceedings and approximately 49 applications or appeals between 1997 and 2002. Mr Alexander had repeatedly pursued unsuccessful claims, applications for stays, and applications for permission to appeal, including proceedings in which he was a defendant. The central issues were whether his conduct was habitual and persistent, vexatious, and without reasonable ground, and whether applications to the Court of Appeal fell within section 42(1)(b).

1. Order granted. The court was satisfied that Mr Alexander had habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings and made vexatious applications without reasonable grounds. A civil proceedings order was made without limitation of time.
2. The court applied the principles stated in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759. Habitual and persistent litigation commonly involves repeated proceedings based on substantially the same cause of action, automatic challenges to adverse decisions, and disregard of court orders. Repetition is essential, but need not continue over a long period.
3. The proceedings and applications were vexatious because they lacked a reasonable or discernible legal basis, imposed inconvenience, harassment and expense disproportionate to any possible gain, and abused the court process. The repeated relitigation of finally determined issues, the numerous unsuccessful applications, and the failure to satisfy costs orders provided cogent evidence.
4. The court was entitled to rely on findings made by judges in the underlying proceedings that Mr Alexander’s conduct had been vexatious or abusive. The protection of other litigants and scarce judicial resources justified exercising the power despite its serious restriction of civil rights.
5. Applications for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal made in the course of civil proceedings were potentially within section 42(1)(b). Mr Justice Mackay applied Attorney General v Jones [1991] WLR 859, holding that the provision included Court of Appeal proceedings on appeal from the High Court, although not proceedings instituted in the Court of Appeal itself. In any event, the High Court applications alone justified the order.