Jaffar v HM Prison Brixton & Anor

Under section 11(3) of the Extradition Act 1989, habeas corpus cannot discharge a person where one of several extradition charges remains valid and the statutory injustice or oppression test is not satisfied in relation to every charge. The court’s inherent jurisdiction is limited and is principally concerned with want of jurisdiction in the extradition process. Disputed limitation issues may be better determined by the Secretary of State or the requesting state’s courts. Passage of time does not by itself make extradition oppressive. The court must assess all the circumstances, including the seriousness of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, prejudice caused by delay, and the expedition and good faith of the requesting authorities.

The applicant sought habeas corpus after the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court committed him to await the Secretary of State’s decision on extradition to Spain on five conspiracy-to-defraud charges. He argued that four charges were time-barred under the Extradition Act 1989 and the European Convention on Extradition Order 2001, and that return on the remaining charge would be unjust or oppressive because of the lapse of time and evidential prejudice.

The court considered whether a valid committal could stand where only some charges were allegedly time-barred, the scope of its inherent jurisdiction, and whether return on the INPAC charge would be oppressive.

1. The application for habeas corpus was refused. The committal order was valid because it was made with jurisdiction and supported by appropriate evidence. Each charge was capable of conferring jurisdiction on the district judge, and the survival of one charge was sufficient.

2. Section 11(3)(b) requires the court to consider whether return would be unjust or oppressive in relation to each offence. The court accepted that return would be oppressive if all five charges were time-barred and proceedings in Spain could not continue. That was not the position on the assumption adopted for this application.

3. The court treated In the Matter of Debs [1998] EWHC Admin 271 as confirming that discharge cannot be ordered unless the challenge succeeds in relation to every offence. The observation in that case was expressly recognised as obiter, but its accuracy was not challenged.

4. The inherent jurisdiction preserved by section 11(3) is confined. It is most appropriately engaged by a want of jurisdiction in the Secretary of State’s authority to proceed or in the committal proceedings. Issues concerning limitation were more appropriately left to the Secretary of State or, where necessary, judicial review of the order to return.

5. Although about fifteen years had elapsed, the allegations were serious and substantial, the applicant had long known their nature, and the case depended largely on documentary evidence. The Spanish authorities had proceeded with due expedition and in good faith. Considering all the circumstances, return on the INPAC charge would not be unjust or oppressive. The court did not determine the ultimate limitation issue or the applicant’s guilt.

The respondent’s costs were awarded in the agreed sum of £4,395.

The judgment does not state an appellate history. The application concerned habeas corpus following the committal order made by Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on 4 November 2002.