Redrow Homes Limited, R (On the Application Of) v First Secretary of State & Anor

A condition attached when approving details under an outline planning permission is lawful only if it remains within the scope of the parent permission. It cannot modify or revoke a permission already granted, even where changed circumstances make the permitted development harmful or unsafe. The permission must be construed as a whole, including its operative terms, conditions and stated reasons. Where the parent permission grants an all-purpose access, approval of details may regulate its design to achieve a safe and satisfactory connection with the current highway network, but cannot restrict its use to particular traffic. A restriction of that kind requires a modification order under section 100 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, with compensation consequences under section 107.

The claimant challenged, under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, a decision allowing its appeal against South Gloucestershire Council’s failure to determine an application for approval of details under condition 5 of a 1957 outline planning permission.

The permission covered extensive industrial and commercial development and expressly authorised three accesses, including access 6C. The Secretary of State approved the details but imposed conditions restricting access 6C to public service vehicles and requiring a redesign to enforce that restriction. The central issue was whether those conditions unlawfully modified the parent permission.

1. The application was allowed and the Secretary of State’s decision was quashed. The power to impose conditions on approval of details is subject to the fundamental limit that the conditions must not amount to revocation or modification of the parent outline permission.

2. The 1957 permission had to be construed as a whole, including its operative provisions, conditions and reasons. Paragraph (v), read with the scale and nature of the authorised development, granted permission for accesses suitable for all traffic generated by the substantial industrial and commercial development. Condition 6 expressly restricted access 6B in relation to heavy goods vehicles. That express restriction showed that condition 5 did not itself permit restrictions on the classes of traffic using access 6A or 6C.

3. Condition 5 permitted approval of the precise location and detailed design of an all-purpose access. The Secretary of State could take account of present-day traffic conditions and the wider highway network when assessing whether the design was safe and satisfactory. That power extended to securing the best, or least worst, all-purpose access reasonably achievable within the limits of the permission.

4. The public-service-vehicle-only condition was materially more restrictive than the limitation imposed on access 6B. It therefore modified the permission for an all-purpose access at 6C. The availability of other accesses, or the continuing usefulness of a restricted access, did not alter that conclusion. Any practical benefit from those matters could be reflected in compensation, but they did not remove the need for a modification order.

5. If changed traffic conditions made the best achievable all-purpose access unacceptable, the Secretary of State’s remedy was to make a modification or revocation order under section 100, with compensation under section 107, rather than impose the restriction through approval of details. The Article 6 issue was not determined because the primary ground succeeded. Permission to appeal was refused, although time for an application to the Court of Appeal was extended to 21 days.

This was a first-instance claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Secretary of State’s decision dated 6 May 2003 was quashed. Permission to appeal was refused, with 21 days allowed for an application to the Court of Appeal.