Taylor & Bartley v Prosol Facade Access Ltd & Ors

In a fatal accident dependency claim, the court must assess the probable financial loss caused by the death. A surviving partner’s earning capacity is relevant where the evidence shows that, had the deceased lived, both partners would probably have worked and contributed to the family finances. Existing arrangements provide useful evidence, but the assessment concerns the hypothetical future and must account for likely earnings, childcare costs and other realistic contingencies. The court must distinguish between employment the survivor would probably have undertaken if the deceased had lived and employment undertaken only because death created financial necessity. Means-tested benefits received after death are not ordinarily deducted where they are not benefits caused by the death.

The claimants, as administrators of Peter Docking’s estate, brought proceedings under the Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1934 and on behalf of his partner and dependent children under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. Mr Docking died in a suspended cradle accident while working as a window cleaner. Liability between the defendants had been agreed, subject to the court’s assessment of damages.

The principal issues concerned the deceased’s probable future earnings, the appropriate multipliers, the value of his services, and whether Laura Taylor’s earning capacity should reduce her dependency claim. The central question was what would probably have happened had the deceased remained alive.

1. Judgment was given on the assessment of dependency damages. Liability issues had been agreed between the defendants, and the court determined the principal financial heads of loss.

2. Section 3(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 requires damages to be proportional to the injury resulting from the death to the dependants. The relevant loss is the probable pecuniary advantage that would have been received from the deceased, assessed by reference to what would probably have happened if he had lived.

3. Laura Taylor’s earning capacity had to be taken into account because the evidence supported the reasonable inference that both she and the deceased would have worked and contributed to the family finances. Existing financial arrangements were important evidence, but they were not conclusive. The court had to estimate the future loss, including probable pay rises, continued full-time work and the cost of childcare.

4. The relevant inquiry was not what the widow was forced to do because of the death. It was what her employment would probably have been had the deceased remained alive. The proposed intermediate approach, under which only earnings after the younger child reached 14 would be deducted, had no sufficient basis in the authorities or evidence.

5. The deceased would probably have qualified as a black cab driver, continued as a window cleaner with modest supervisory progression, and contributed services in caring for the children and maintaining the home. The court assessed the relevant dependency losses using appropriate earnings figures and multipliers, including deductions for the childcare which would have been required.

6. Income support, child benefit and housing benefit were not deducted. They were means-tested or needs-based benefits, were not received in consequence of the death, and would have been reduced by the damages award.

7. The final terms of judgment and orders were reserved for submissions from counsel.