Attorney General v Purvis

A civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 is justified where the evidence establishes habitual litigation involving knowingly meritless claims, harassment, dishonesty, or serious inconvenience and expense to others. The court may impose consequential requirements governing applications for permission to bring proceedings and to act as a Litigation Friend or McKenzie Friend. A judicial review application concerning a trial on indictment is barred by section 29(3) of the Act. Complaints about the conduct of such a trial must be pursued through the criminal appellate process.

The Attorney-General applied for a final civil proceedings order against Paul Purvis, whose extensive civil litigation was alleged to be vexatious and dishonest. The court also considered whether to continue restrictions on his acting as a Litigation Friend or McKenzie Friend. Mr Purvis sought an adjournment on health and other grounds, but did not appear or provide supporting medical evidence.

Separately, he renewed an application for permission to seek judicial review of the Crown Court’s decision to continue his criminal trial in his absence. Permission had previously been refused on paper by Moses J. The central issues were whether the statutory grounds for a civil proceedings order were established and whether the Administrative Court had jurisdiction to entertain the proposed challenge.

1. The application for an adjournment was dismissed. Assertions of ill-health, particularly against a history of non-attendance and delay, required proper supporting evidence. The material before the court showed that Mr Purvis had continued to conduct litigation elsewhere while claiming to be unable to attend these proceedings.

2. The Attorney-General’s application for a final civil proceedings order was granted under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The evidence established a sustained pattern of vexatious litigation. It included knowingly meritless claims, proceedings brought to harass others, dishonest affidavits and claims, repeated applications, abuse of court process, and substantial unnecessary expense to creditors and other parties.

3. Mr Justice Jackson agreed that the statutory grounds were clearly established. The order was not based on a single obsessive dispute, but on a broad and continuing pattern of irresponsible litigation combined with dishonesty.

4. The court continued the existing restriction on Mr Purvis acting as a Litigation Friend or McKenzie Friend. Applications under section 42 for permission to bring civil proceedings were required to annex this judgment. Applications for permission to act as a McKenzie Friend were required to annex the relevant earlier order, the new order and this judgment.

5. The renewed judicial review application was dismissed as completely hopeless. Under section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, a decision relating to a trial on indictment was not open to challenge in the Administrative Court. In any event, the complaints about the trial continuing in Mr Purvis’s absence had been addressed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on his criminal appeal.

The judgment records that permission to seek judicial review had been refused on paper by Moses J. The renewed application was dismissed by the Divisional Court. The judgment also records that the underlying complaints about the criminal trial had been considered by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).