F, R (on the application of) v Crown Prosecution Service & Anor

A final warning under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 requires an unequivocal admission to a constable. The scheme encourages early frankness and swift intervention, but it preserves a discretion to consider the circumstances of each case. A young person who denies guilt or remains silent cannot later claim a final warning as of right after charge and court appearance. The police may lawfully decline to re-interview or warn where the statutory conditions are unmet and the delay was caused by the claimant’s earlier refusal to admit the offence. The Crown Prosecution Service retains an independent discretion to continue a prosecution where the police decline to issue a warning. Judicial review of that discretion is exceptional and requires a decision made regardless of, or clearly contrary to, a settled public-interest policy.

The claimant, aged 14 when involved in an aggravated vehicle-taking incident, was charged after declining to answer questions in police interview. He later indicated through his solicitors that he might admit involvement and sought a final warning. The police declined to re-interview him or administer a warning, and the Crown Prosecution Service refused to discontinue the prosecution.

He sought judicial review of three decisions: the police decision not to re-interview him, the refusal to administer a final warning, and the CPS decision to continue the prosecution. The central issues were whether the statutory conditions for a warning had been met, whether the police had unlawfully failed to exercise their discretion, and whether the CPS decision was irrational or contrary to governing policy.

1. Claim dismissed. The police and the CPS acted lawfully.
2. Paragraph 16.5 of Code C issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 did not permit a further interview. The claimant’s refusal to answer questions was not an ambiguity requiring clarification, and guarded indications from his solicitors were not information concerning the offence which had come to light within the meaning of the provision. In any event, the police had no obligation to re-interview him, and the challenged operational decision was not one for the court to retake.
3. Section 65(1)(c) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 required the offender to admit the offence to a constable. The claimant had made no unequivocal admission. The police therefore had no power to administer a final warning on the evidence before the court.
4. Even if a later admission had been made, the police retained a discretion. The statutory scheme and guidance favoured speed and early frankness. Being charged and brought before the court before any indication of admission emerged, together with the delay caused by the claimant’s earlier silence, were powerful factors against a warning. They were not conclusive, but were lawfully relevant to the public-interest assessment and the exercise of discretion.
5. The CPS was not bound by the police’s view, nor were the police bound by the CPS’s recommendation. Each agency had an independent statutory function. The CPS properly considered the evidence, the realistic prospect of conviction, the prevalence and circumstances of the offence, the claimant’s interests, the absence of a warning, and the wider public interest.
6. Applying R v Chief Constable of Kent County Constabulary and another, ex parte L (a minor) [1993] 1 All ER 756, the CPS discretion was reviewable only where the decision was made regardless of, or clearly contrary to, a settled DPP policy developed in the public interest. That threshold was not met. No order was made against the claimant for the defendants’ costs; the claimant’s publicly funded costs were subject to the appropriate order upon lodging the certificate.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the High Court (Administrative Court). The claim against both defendants was dismissed.