Telia Sonera AB v Hilcourt (Docklands) Ltd

Permission for a further appeal under the Arbitration Act 1996 should be granted only where the statutory requirement of general importance or another special reason is genuinely satisfied. A point capable of arising under many contracts may initially appear to be of general importance, but its practical significance must be assessed in context. The legislative history, the absence of previous litigation on the issue and the Act’s policy of speed, efficiency and finality may show that the issue lacks pressing general importance. Where the arbitrator and the High Court have reached the same conclusion for essentially the same reasons, and the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success, permission should ordinarily be refused.

The claimant sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court’s decision on an appeal from an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act 1996. The underlying issue concerned the meaning and effect of section 48(5)(b), including whether the relevant statutory words applied by reference to a contract viewed as a whole or to the particular provision sought to be enforced.

Permission had previously been granted to appeal from the arbitrator because the issue was considered potentially important. The arbitrator and the High Court reached the same decision. The question was whether a further appeal met the requirements of section 69(8).

1. Permission refused. The court declined to grant permission for a further appeal under section 69(8) of the Arbitration Act 1996.
2. Section 69(8) requires the court to consider that the proposed appeal raises a question of general importance or involves some other special reason warranting consideration by the Court of Appeal. The fact that the issue concerns statutory wording capable of applying to many contracts may support an initial view that it is generally important, but that is not conclusive.
3. The court took account of the history of section 48(5)(b), which extended back to the Arbitration Act 1934, and the apparent absence of any earlier litigation on the point. Those matters indicated that the issue was not, in reality, one of pressing general importance.
4. The court also considered the statutory policy favouring speed, efficiency and finality in arbitration. That policy informs the restrictions on appeals from arbitrators and on further appeals from the High Court.
5. Both the arbitrator and the High Court had reached the same conclusion for essentially the same reasons. In the circumstances, continuing uncertainty in the arbitration was inappropriate, particularly since the proposed appeal did not have a real prospect of success. The claimant’s application for permission was therefore refused.

The judgment itself records an earlier decision by Mr Justice Neuberger granting permission to appeal from the arbitrator under section 69(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996. The present court refused permission for a further appeal to the Court of Appeal under section 69(8).