Johnson v Stratford Magistrates' Court

The prosecution’s disclosure obligation may arise at common law, including in summary proceedings instituted by summons. The court need not resolve the precise statutory meaning of “charged” where the common-law obligation is sufficient. Disclosure extends to material which may assist the defence, but only material within the prosecution’s possession or control is ordinarily disclosable. Where the material sought has already been adequately provided, or is held by third parties, further disclosure may not justify postponing a trial. A stay or vacation of the trial date requires a proper basis, including a realistic prospect that non-disclosure will adversely affect trial fairness. A lengthy history of defence adjournments and repeated readiness for trial may be decisive against further delay.

The claimant faced a speeding charge arising from an alleged offence on 7 July 1999. Proceedings were instituted by information and summons. After numerous adjournments, challenges and reviews, the claimant sought a stay and vacation of the trial date, alleging failures of disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The District Judge held that the statutory disclosure provisions did not apply to proceedings commenced by summons and that further disclosure would be disproportionate. The claimant sought judicial review of that decision. The central issues were whether disclosure was required, whether the requested material was in the prosecution’s possession, and whether the proceedings should be stayed or delayed.

1. Application dismissed. The court declined to determine the precise ambit of “charged” in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The Director of Public Prosecutions conceded that the common-law disclosure obligation, particularly in the light of Article 6, could require disclosure in appropriate summary proceedings instituted by summons.
2. The Home Office approval governing conditions of use and the ACPO guidelines could not properly be regarded as being in the prosecution’s possession for disclosure purposes. If sought, they would require consideration as third-party disclosure. The material was therefore not a proper basis for treating the prosecution as having failed in its disclosure duty.
3. The calibration certificate had in substance been disclosed. The photographs served on the defence contained calibration details, and other material confirmed the certification. In the context of the defence’s repeated confirmation that it would call no expert evidence, the prosecution had adequately complied with any applicable disclosure obligation.
4. In any event, the history of the proceedings provided no proper basis for a further stay or vacation of the trial date. The alleged offence was more than three years old when the stay was sought. The defence had repeatedly sought or accepted adjournments, had known of the photographic and calibration evidence since March 2000, had confirmed readiness for trial in May 2002, and had repeatedly delayed raising the reliability issue.
5. Even assuming that further disclosure was required, there was no reason to believe that its absence would adversely affect the fairness of the trial. Further delay was therefore unjustified, and the District Judge’s refusal to stay the proceedings or vacate the trial date was upheld.

The claimant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.

• Magistrates' Court: The District Judge refused to stay the speeding proceedings or vacate the trial date, holding that the statutory disclosure provisions did not apply to proceedings commenced by summons and that further disclosure was unnecessary.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Judicial review dismissed. The court upheld the refusal of a stay and declined to determine the statutory construction point.