JC Decaux Ltd. v First Secretary of State

In advertisement control, decisions must be made only in the interests of amenity and public safety, taking account of material factors within those interests. Development-plan and other policies concerning amenity may be relevant, but they cannot determine the application without an assessment of the particular advertisement at the particular site. A policy’s excessive prescription affects the weight given to it, not its legal relevance.

Consistency with comparable decisions is a material consideration, but an inspector need give only brief reasons explaining any material differences. The court should not substitute its own visual assessment for an inspector’s planning judgment. A challenge based on Wednesbury unreasonableness is especially difficult where the conclusion rests on a site inspection and visual amenity.

The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an inspector’s decision dismissing two appeals under regulation 15 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992. The appeals concerned illuminated display panels refused by the local planning authority on visual amenity grounds under Policy BD12 of the adopted unitary development plan.

The claimant alleged that the inspector had treated an unlawful policy as material, failed to determine whether it was over-prescriptive, raised a new “gateway” issue without a fair opportunity to respond, failed to address consistency with comparable sites, and reached an irrational and disproportionate conclusion.

1. Application dismissed. The inspector’s decision was lawful and the claimant was ordered to pay the first defendant’s costs, summarily assessed at £5,331.
2. Regulation 4 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992 permits consideration only of matters material to amenity and public safety. There is no separate category of “other material considerations”. Nevertheless, policies concerning advertisement control and amenity may be relevant. Regulation 4(1)(a) does not provide an exhaustive list of amenity factors. Each application must still be considered on its own merits.
3. Policy BD12 was capable of being relevant because it concerned visual amenity. Its possibly over-prescriptive character, or inconsistency with PPG19, affected the weight to be given to it. The inspector treated it as capable of carrying some weight but did not rely on it in reaching his conclusions. He instead assessed the visual effect of the particular signs at the particular location consistently with PPG19.
4. The inspector was entitled to describe the rebuilt bridge and its surroundings as a “gateway” to Leeds. This was a convenient description of the site impression formed during inspection, not a technical planning designation or a wholly new issue. The underlying matters—prominence, improvements to the bridge and embankment, and visual impact—had been debated.
5. An inspector addressing consistency with comparable decisions must give adequate reasons, but those reasons may be brief. The inspector identified shared characteristics and explained the fundamental differences: the attractive bridge and embankment, together with the visual clutter created by the proposed signs and existing signage. He was required to give reasons for his decision, not reasons for his reasons.
6. The visual impact of advertisements is pre-eminently a matter of planning judgment, often informed by a site inspection. Where an expert tribunal has made such a judgment, the threshold for establishing Wednesbury unreasonableness is particularly high. The Article 1 First Protocol argument added nothing substantive because the Regulations already balance landowner and public interests.

First-instance judicial review application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. No earlier court decision is stated in the judgment.