Paramanathan, R (on the application of) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal & Ors

An application for permission to appeal under rule 18(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 2000 requires consideration of whether the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success or whether another compelling reason exists. The test is not whether the original decision was merely within the range of reasonable decisions. Where an adjudicator accepts material evidence, but draws a significant adverse inference without explaining its evidential basis, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal must engage with that reasoning. In an asylum case, the court must apply anxious scrutiny before concluding that permission would inevitably have been refused. A flawed refusal of permission should be quashed and remitted for reconsideration.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal against an adjudicator’s dismissal of his asylum and human-rights appeal. The adjudicator accepted the claimant’s account of detention, ill-treatment and a confession to LTTE membership, but inferred that the Sri Lankan authorities had no continuing interest in him and would keep no relevant record. The Tribunal held that this was a finding of fact to which the adjudicator was entitled. The central issues were whether the Tribunal applied the correct statutory test and whether, applying that test, it was safe to conclude that the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.

1. The claim succeeded. The Tribunal’s determination was quashed and remitted for further consideration.
2. Rule 18(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 2000 required permission to be granted where the Tribunal was satisfied that the appeal had a real prospect of success or where another compelling reason existed. The Tribunal’s reference to the adjudicator being entitled to reach her conclusion did not, viewed fairly, establish that it had applied a Wednesbury test rather than the statutory test.
3. The adjudicator had accepted that the claimant had assisted the LTTE, had been arrested and beaten, and had signed a confession to LTTE membership. Against that background, her conclusion that there would be no record of the arrest or confession, and no continuing official interest, was an inference requiring explanation. The reasoning in paragraphs 63–65 did not explain, by reference to the evidence, why the accepted confession would not remain relevant.
4. Those deficiencies gave the proposed appeal a real prospect of success. Although other tribunal decisions might have led to refusal of permission, that was not the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal. In an asylum case requiring anxious scrutiny, it was unsafe for the court to conclude that permission would inevitably have been refused despite the defects in the adjudicator’s reasoning.
5. The appropriate relief was to quash the Tribunal’s determination and remit the matter so that it could reconsider whether permission should be granted in light of the judgment. Costs were awarded; permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused.

• Immigration adjudicator: dismissed the claimant’s asylum and human-rights appeal on 11 March 2002.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: refused permission to appeal by determination made on 16 April 2002 and notified on 29 April 2002.
• High Court (Administrative Court): quashed the Tribunal’s determination and remitted the matter for further consideration.