Scuka v Governor of HM Prison Brixton & Anor

Triviality under section 11(3)(a) of the Extradition Act 1989 is a fact-sensitive question concerning the nature and quality of the alleged conduct in all the circumstances. The value involved, the likely sentence, or the fact that a magistrates’ court could accept jurisdiction is not determinative. Conduct involving bullying or exploitation of a vulnerable person may be sufficiently serious to pass the triviality threshold. Proportionality is inherent in the statutory test, but the probable outcome and time spent on remand arise only if the offence is otherwise trivial. Where extradition and asylum proceedings overlap, they remain distinct processes and extradition proceedings should ordinarily take their normal course.

The applicant faced two committal orders made by the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court in response to extradition requests by the Czech Republic. The allegations concerned bullying and coercion of a vulnerable young prisoner and theft of a purse containing a small amount of money, transport tickets and a house key. He challenged detention by two applications for habeas corpus.

The issues were whether the offences were trivial under section 11(3)(a) of the Extradition Act 1989, whether the bullying allegation corresponded to an offence under English law, and whether extradition proceedings should await the determination of his asylum claim.

1. Both applications were refused. The committal orders were not invalidated by the triviality exception.

2. Triviality was a matter of fact and degree. The court considered the nature and quality of each alleged act in its context. The bullying allegation involved older prisoners ganging up on a much younger and vulnerable prisoner. Bullying in institutions, particularly of vulnerable people, could be an extremely serious matter. The theft could not be treated as trivial merely because only about £2.80 was alleged to have been stolen. The court also considered the victim’s vulnerability, the loss of transport and house keys, and the damage allegedly caused.

3. The likely domestic treatment of comparable conduct, the prospect of a non-custodial sentence, the magistrates’ jurisdiction and proportionality did not make the offences trivial. Proportionality was inherent in section 11. The likely outcome in the requesting state and time spent on remand could bear on oppression, but only if the offence first came within the triviality provision. The public interest in complying with treaty obligations was also relevant.

4. The particulars’ use of the word “forced”, in circumstances involving alleged group bullying, fairly supported an inference of violence or threats of violence. The District Judge was entitled to conclude that the conduct corresponded to the relevant English offence under section 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The committal stage did not require evidence sufficient to establish a case to answer.

5. Following R (on the Application of Karpichov & Marais) v Latvia and the Republic of South Africa and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extradition proceedings should ordinarily take their normal course notwithstanding a pending asylum claim. The two processes involved different tests, and there was no real risk of extradition before the asylum claim was determined.

Bail was continued with two additional surrender conditions. Reporting was reduced to twice weekly, and costs were subject to the usual legal aid taxation.

Not stated in the judgment.