Prela, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

When reviewing a discretionary immigration decision, the court asks whether the decision-maker considered the material matters and whether the decision was legally irrational, unreasonable or otherwise flawed. The court does not substitute its own assessment of the weight to be given to compassionate circumstances, including past torture or medical evidence. An unequivocal acceptance that torture occurred, together with express consideration of the relevant medical report, may satisfy the duty to take those matters into account even where the decision-maker concludes that they do not justify departure from policy.

The claimant, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, challenged the Secretary of State’s refusal to grant exceptional leave to remain. An adjudicator had allowed his earlier asylum appeal, but the Immigration Appeal Tribunal subsequently allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal. On a later human rights appeal, the adjudicator dismissed the Convention grounds but strongly recommended exceptional leave, referring to the claimant’s torture, mental health, family circumstances and conditions in Kosovo.

The Secretary of State reconsidered the recommendation and again refused to depart from the relevant policy. The judicial review challenge alleged that insufficient attention had been given to the claimant’s torture and medical condition.

1. The claim was rejected. The Secretary of State’s decision was not shown to be Wednesbury irrational, unreasonable or otherwise flawed.
2. The adjudicator’s findings established that the claimant had suffered serious torture. The Secretary of State’s decision, read as a whole, showed that this matter had been considered and accepted. The use of the word “may” in a later passage did not undermine the unqualified acceptance elsewhere in the decision.
3. The court would not infer that the Secretary of State was required to reach a particular conclusion merely because the claimant had suffered torture. The submission that no reasonable decision-maker could refuse exceptional leave in those circumstances was untenable.
4. The Secretary of State had also taken Dr Steadman’s medical report into account and accepted its substance and findings. The report described psychological difficulties, but also recorded significant improvement, relative psychological settlement, and the absence of psychological medication or counselling. The later medical documents had not been before the Secretary of State and did not establish that the report necessarily demonstrated exceptional compassionate circumstances.
5. The adjudicator had expressly rejected any breach or likely breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Secretary of State’s policy was not challenged. The decision therefore disclosed no reviewable error.

1. Adjudicator: allowed the claimant’s asylum appeal on 13 October 2000.
2. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal on 13 February 2001.
3. Adjudicator, Mr District Judge Adam: dismissed the claimant’s later human rights grounds but recommended exceptional leave to remain.
4. High Court (Administrative Court): rejected the judicial review claim.