Director of Public Prosecutions v Ubhi

Special reasons for avoiding disqualification after drink-driving require an objective assessment. The court must examine the seriousness of the emergency, the quality of the driving and whether alternative means of assistance or transport were available. The question is what a reasonable person, sharing the defendant’s relevant characteristics, would have done in the circumstances, not what the defendant personally believed was reasonable. A driver may delegate enquiries in an emergency, but the court must assess whether reliance on the information received was reasonable. If duress of circumstances amounts to a defence, it cannot also constitute special reasons following a guilty plea.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated from the decision of Shropshire justices at Telford on 9 August 2002. The respondent had pleaded guilty to driving with alcohol above the prescribed limit. The justices found special reasons not to disqualify him after he drove his sister towards hospital during an apparent medical emergency, relying partly on enquiries delegated to another person.

The issue was whether the justices had applied the correct legal approach when finding special reasons, including whether they had properly considered the emergency, available alternatives and the respondent’s reliance on information supplied by another person.

1. The appeal was allowed. The justices’ decision was quashed and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted bench for consideration afresh. The court declined to direct disqualification because special reasons might still be established if the correct approach were followed.
2. Special reasons require the justices to consider the whole circumstances objectively. They must assess the nature and degree of the emergency, the quality of the driving and, with particular care, whether alternative means of transport or assistance were available. The approach stated in Taylor v Rajan [1974] RTR 304 was applied.
3. The test is not whether the defendant personally believed that driving was justified. The question is whether a reasonable person, faced with the circumstances, would have acted in that way. The objective approach reflected in Jacobs v Reid [1974] RLT 71 was material.
4. Where a driver relies on another person to obtain assistance, the justices must determine whether a reasonable person would have delegated the task and whether it would have been reasonable to accept the information given. The absence of findings on those matters was a fundamental defect.
5. The duress of circumstances test stated in R v Martin [1989] RTA 63 asks whether the accused acted because he reasonably feared death or serious physical injury and whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing his characteristics, might have acted similarly. If duress of circumstances is relied on as a defence, it is a defence to the charge rather than special reasons. Since no such defence had been raised, the justices should not have referred to duress.
6. The court left open the wider jurisprudential question, noted in DPP v Whittle [1996] RTA 154, whether a genuine emergency should ordinarily be treated as a complete defence.
7. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs, with determination of liability for payment postponed pending further application.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal by way of case stated, quashed the justices’ decision and remitted the matter to a differently constituted bench.
• Shropshire justices sitting at Telford: on 9 August 2002, found special reasons not to disqualify the respondent from driving.