Barrett v Universal-Island Records Ltd & Anor

Summary judgment and strike-out applications, including applications based on alleged abuse of process, require a high degree of confidence that the claim or defence cannot succeed at trial. The court must avoid conducting a mini-trial. Complexity, disputed evidence and the need for detailed factual investigation may make summary determination inappropriate, even where the court suspects that the claim will ultimately fail. The discretion to refuse summary relief may also be exercised where it would not save substantial court time or expense, or where substantially the same issues would proceed to trial in any event. A settlement binds only those within its scope. A deceased person’s estate is not bound by a settlement to which neither the deceased nor the estate was party merely because the estate’s administrator was a party in another capacity.

Aston Barrett sued Universal-Island Records Ltd and UMG Recordings Inc in connection with recordings made by Bob Marley and the Wailers. He claimed contractual royalties, copyright infringement, performers’ rights infringement and unjust enrichment, both personally and as administrator of his late brother Carlton Barrett’s estate.

The defendants sought to add Marley’s adult beneficiaries, obtain permission for a counterclaim, strike out the claim as an abuse of process, and obtain summary judgment. They relied principally on a 1994 settlement agreement and the dismissal with prejudice of earlier Jamaican and New York proceedings. The central questions were whether the settlement and earlier litigation barred the claims, and whether the substantive claims were sufficiently hopeless for summary determination.

1. The court allowed the Marley Adult Beneficiaries to be added as defendants and Part 20 claimants and allowed the consequential amendments. The applications for strike out and summary judgment were dismissed.

2. CPR 3.4(2) and CPR 24.2 confer discretionary powers. Applications based on abuse of process are not subject to a different summary standard from other applications for final relief. In every case the court must have a high degree of confidence that no injustice will result and that the claim or defence cannot succeed at trial.

3. The principles identified in Wenlock v Maloney [1965] 1 WLR 1243, Williams & Humbert Ltd v W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Limited [1986] AC 368 and Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] 2 All ER 513 require the court to avoid resolving complex factual disputes by a mini-trial on documents without discovery or oral evidence. Summary judgment is intended for cases which are not fit for trial.

4. The discretion to refuse summary relief may be appropriate where the order would not save court time, would not relieve the successful party from substantially participating in a trial, or where substantially the same parties and issues would have to be tried even if the application succeeded.

5. The 1994 settlement agreement did not bind Carlton Barrett or his estate. Neither was party to the settled proceedings or agreement, and clause 7 recognised the possibility of claims on behalf of the estate. The defendants therefore failed to establish that the estate’s claims should be barred. No issue estoppel arose from the dismissal with prejudice of proceedings to which Carlton was not party.

6. The judge considered the personal contractual claim under the 1975 Recording Agreement to be fanciful and would have been minded to strike it out if it stood alone. It did not, however, dispose of the wider litigation because alternative copyright, performers’ rights and other claims remained. The factual and legal issues were too numerous and complex to justify summary determination.

First-instance decision. The judgment does not state any subsequent appellate history.