Walden, R (on the application of) v Highbury Corner Magistrates' Court

Applications to adjourn a summary criminal trial require a careful examination of the circumstances causing the delay, the reasons for it, and its consequences for both prosecution and defence. The inquiry is one of fairness, with no rigid rule favouring either side. Applications must receive rigorous scrutiny, particularly where the prosecution caused the failure by inadequate preparation. Seriousness of the allegation and the fact that the case is listed for trial for the first time are insufficient reasons by themselves. Judicial review may intervene where the magistrates’ exercise of discretion is plainly flawed or produces substantial unfairness. Adequate reasons must show that the relevant competing interests have been considered.

Two claimants sought judicial review of separate decisions by Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court to adjourn opposed prosecutions for excess-alcohol driving offences. In each case, the prosecution witnesses failed to attend because they apparently had not been warned, and no explanation was provided. The magistrates granted the adjournment. In Walden’s case they relied on the seriousness of the allegation and the fact that it was the first trial listing. In Stern’s case they gave no reasons and did not address his serious illness and the resulting stress. Permission had been granted on the papers.

1. The applications succeeded. The orders granting the adjournments, and the decisions refusing to dismiss the prosecutions, were quashed.
2. Under section 10(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, the magistrates had a discretionary power to adjourn a trial. The exercise of that discretion required consideration of the circumstances leading to the application, the reasons for it, and the consequences for both prosecution and defence.
3. The court adopted the guidance in R v Hereford Magistrates' Court, ex parte Rowlands [1998] QB 110 and R v Abedare Justices, ex parte DPP [1990] 155JP 324. There were no hard and fast rules. Fairness had to be assessed in all the circumstances, and adjournment applications required rigorous scrutiny regardless of which party made them.
4. Although appellate courts should be slow to interfere with an adjournment decision, intervention was justified here. The prosecution was responsible for the failure of its witnesses to attend, no explanation had been investigated or provided, and the magistrates had not properly examined the causes of the default or its consequences. In Walden’s case, the reasons given addressed only the seriousness of the allegation and the first trial listing. In Stern’s case, no reasons were given at all.
5. The seriousness of the charges and the possibility that refusal would cause the prosecutions to collapse could not substitute for the required assessment. Each adjournment should have been refused, with the consequence that the relevant prosecution would have been dismissed. Costs were ordered from central funds for Stern, subject to assessment, and Walden’s costs were subject to public funding assessment.

Permission to apply for judicial review was granted by a single judge on the papers. The applications then came before the Administrative Court, which quashed the magistrates’ adjournment decisions and the refusals to dismiss the prosecutions.