Ahmed v Birmingham Magistrates' Court

In deciding whether a defendant has been tried within a reasonable time under article 6, the court must assess the delay across the proceedings as a whole. Responsibility for particular periods is relevant but is not decisive. Any culpable delay by the defendant is an important consideration, but the absence of such fault does not itself determine the issue. A fragmented assessment of separate periods may fail to address the central question. Where a very substantial delay has occurred in a simple case, the reviewing court may quash the decision and decline to remit the matter where further delay would be unjustified.

The claimant sought judicial review of a decision by District Judge Bopa Rai dated 8 May 2002. The district judge had considered whether the prolonged proceedings for alleged dangerous driving breached the claimant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under article 6, and had concluded that they did not. The claimant challenged that assessment, relying on the history of delays in issuing and pursuing the summonses. The central issue was whether the delay should be assessed by separate periods or across the proceedings as a whole.

1. The application for judicial review succeeded. The district judge’s decision was quashed, and the matter was not remitted to the Magistrates’ Court because further delay would have been inappropriate.
2. The relevant question under article 6 was whether the trial had taken place within a reasonable time. The court had to examine the period from the relevant starting point until the anticipated trial date as a whole. A delay of approximately three years in bringing a simple dangerous-driving case to trial was unusual and required assessment in that overall context.
3. Responsibility for delay was a factor to be taken into account, but it was not decisive. Delay attributable to the prosecution, police or court could be relevant without determining the result. Conversely, conduct by a defendant such as escaping or making himself unavailable would be an important factor. No such conduct was established here.
4. The district judge had divided the proceedings into three periods and had treated parts of the delay as not caused by the prosecution. In doing so, she failed to consider the total period. The documents before the Administrative Court also showed that the factual basis for treating the prosecution as conscientiously pursuing the case was unsupported, particularly during the first six months of 2001.
5. The Administrative Court would not substitute its own conclusion for the district judge’s. However, because the delay had become very significant and the relevant material was now available, the appropriate order was to quash the decision without sending the matter back for reconsideration. The claimant’s costs were to be taxed in the ordinary way.

Permission for judicial review was granted on paper by Ouseley J. The Administrative Court quashed the District Judge’s decision of 8 May 2002 and declined to remit the matter.