Jones, R (on the application of) v Mansfield District Council

For a Schedule 2 development, an environmental impact assessment is required only where the development would be likely to have significant effects on the environment. The local planning authority must make an informed judgment on the information available, taking account of gaps and uncertainties. It need not obtain the same comprehensive information required for the later assessment stage. Further surveys do not automatically require an assessment or prevent a decision on screening, provided the existing information reasonably supports the conclusion that significant effects are unlikely. The decision is reviewable on Wednesbury grounds. Minor environmental effects remain material planning considerations, but do not themselves bring a development within the EIA regime.

The claimant sought judicial review of Mansfield District Council’s decisions to conclude that an environmental impact assessment was unnecessary and to grant outline planning permission for a 28.4-hectare industrial estate. The site included open countryside used by the claimant and was potentially relevant to golden plovers, bats and other wildlife.

The council had before it ecological surveys, consultation responses, planning reports, conditions and a unilateral undertaking providing for further ecological surveys and mitigation. The central issue was whether the council could lawfully decide that significant environmental effects were unlikely despite incomplete information and further surveys being contemplated.

1. Screening information. The committee had to consider first whether it possessed sufficient information to form a sensible judgment about the likelihood of significant environmental effects. That was itself a matter for the authority, subject to Wednesbury review. The information required at this first stage is generally less extensive than the environmental information required after an EIA is found necessary. Regulation 5 reinforced that conclusion by contemplating a brief description and a speedy screening decision.
2. No precautionary gloss. The Regulations did not impose a special bounding principle, a low gateway, or a rule that uncertainty must always be resolved in favour of requiring an EIA. The authority had to make an informed judgment under the statutory test, having regard to available information, gaps and uncertainties. Whether those matters prevented a reasonable conclusion depended on the circumstances.
3. Application to the evidence. The committee reasonably concluded that significant effects on golden plovers were unlikely. The material indicated that any lost habitat was relatively small in the wider area and that farming practices had greater influence. The further survey work was intended to improve general understanding and was not considered necessary to make the screening decision.
4. The committee also reasonably concluded that significant effects on bats were unlikely. Earlier surveys had found potential roost sites but no evidence of bats. Further surveys and timing conditions could properly be used as precautionary mitigation without making the screening decision unlawful.
5. Authorities. Hardy was distinguishable because the committee there had decided that surveys were required to determine whether significant adverse effects might exist. Tew concerned the adequacy of environmental information where an EIA was required and did not govern the initial screening decision. Milne supported the conclusion that sufficient information may exist despite unknown details or further surveys.
6. The decision that no EIA was required was lawful and reasonable. The consequential grant of planning permission was also lawful. The challenge to both decisions was dismissed.