Muwanguzi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Article 8 requires adequate accommodation for a destitute asylum seeker and requires the decision-maker to consider the claimant’s personal circumstances. It does not confer a right to particular accommodation. Relocation may interfere with physical and psychological integrity and may therefore engage Article 8, but the interference may be justified. In deciding whether to disperse an asylum seeker, the Secretary of State must balance the general need to provide accommodation where it is available against the individual’s medical, psychological and social circumstances. A decision is lawful if it could rationally be reached under the statutory scheme and is proportionate in the circumstances.

The claimant, an asylum seeker from Uganda with full-blown AIDS and depressive symptoms, was supported under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and accommodated in London. The Secretary of State decided to disperse her to Leeds, where appropriate HIV treatment was available but her established medical, social, religious and community support networks would be disrupted.

She sought judicial review, alleging irrationality and breach of Article 8. Her asylum claim had been refused by an adjudicator, with an appeal pending before the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The central issue was whether the decision to disperse her could lawfully be made having regard to section 97, the Dispersal Guidelines and Article 8.

1. Application refused. The Secretary of State undertook the relevant assessment under sections 95 and 97 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The question was whether the compassionate factors were so strong that the decision to disperse the claimant was irrational.
2. Article 8 required the Secretary of State to provide adequate accommodation and to consider the claimant’s personal circumstances. It did not require the provision of particular accommodation: Hetoja [2002] EWCHC 2146.
3. The proposed move from London to Leeds was capable of interfering with the claimant’s physical and psychological integrity because it would affect her support systems. Whether that interference amounted to a breach of Article 8 depended on justification in the particular circumstances.
4. The claimant would receive proper medical treatment in Leeds. Her support from London housemates and organisations would be reduced, but the Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that she could form new friendships and obtain support in Leeds. Visits from Uganda could continue. The pending immigration appeal was also a significant source of distress and uncertainty.
5. The Secretary of State was entitled to balance the claimant’s distress and special needs against the general public interest in dispersing asylum seekers to areas where accommodation was available. The decision was rational and proportionate. It was not for the court to substitute its own view of the preferable outcome.
6. The Secretary of State undertook not to move the claimant to Leeds before the anticipated Immigration Appeal Tribunal hearing. Permission to appeal was refused, with renewal to the full court left open. No order for costs was sought.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review decision. The claimant’s asylum application had been refused by an adjudicator, and an appeal was pending before the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The present application to quash the dispersal decision was refused.