Grantchester Retail Parks Plc v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions & Anor

On a statutory challenge to a planning inspector’s decision, the High Court will not substitute its own planning judgment for that of the inspector. An inspector does not generally err in law by failing to consider a decision of another inspector that was not drawn to the inspector’s attention and of which the inspector was unaware. The inspector may make an independent assessment of planning evidence and reach a conclusion different from that of expert witnesses, provided adequate reasons are given. A decision need not refer expressly to every document or submission if the reasoning shows that the relevant issues were addressed. In applying the sequential approach to retail sites, relatively small vacant town-centre units may properly form part of the overall assessment.

The claimant operated an out-of-centre retail park in Luton subject to a planning obligation under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, limiting electrical-goods retail floorspace. It applied under section 106A to remove or relax that restriction. The Council refused the applications, and an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State dismissed the claimant’s two appeals in a decision letter dated 24 July 2002.

The claimant sought to quash that decision under section 288, alleging failures to consider material documents and a previous inspector’s decision, flawed reasoning concerning alternative sites and town-centre impact, and failure to have regard to local-plan policies.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant’s five grounds of challenge failed, and the inspector’s decision was upheld. The claimant was ordered to pay the first defendant’s costs, summarily assessed at £5,350.
2. The inspector correctly identified the statutory issue: whether the planning obligation restricting electrical-goods sales no longer served a useful purpose and, if it continued to do so, whether it would serve that purpose equally well with the proposed modifications. The claimant accepted that formulation.
3. The inspector was entitled to reach his own conclusions on the availability of sequentially preferable sites. He was not required to trace every change in the Council’s internal position or refer expressly to every report, particularly where the relevant material had been addressed in the evidence and submissions.
4. The inspector was entitled to take account of the vacant and temporary-let units in the Arndale Centre as part of the overall sequential assessment, although they were smaller and less significant than the other sites. The sequential exercise did not have to be confined to sites large enough to accommodate the claimant’s preferred retail format.
5. The inspector was entitled to assess the likely effect on Luton town centre independently of the experts’ conclusions. A planning inspector is not confined by expert reports. Reading the relevant paragraphs together, the decision letter supplied adequate reasons for concluding that relaxing the restriction could undermine the town centre’s comparison-shopping role and future vitality and viability.
6. The inspector had correctly summarised the local-plan policies and addressed the issues arising under them. His conclusions fell within the range of conclusions reasonably open to him.
7. As a general principle, a decision-maker does not err in law by failing to take into account a relevant decision which was not drawn to his attention and of which he was unaware. The previous Matalan decision might have been relevant, but it was not brought to the inspector’s attention until after his decision.