Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State

In a planning challenge, an Inspector’s decision must be read as a whole. The court may infer that a personal condition was considered and found unnecessary, even where the decision does not address the point expressly. A temporary permission, together with conditions limiting occupation and the number of caravans, may properly balance planning harm against the personal circumstances of the occupants.

An Inspector’s inquisitorial duty does not generally require investigation of issues that no party has raised. Where a party relies on alternative accommodation and schooling, it must place relevant evidence before the Inspector. A decision will not be quashed for criticisms that do not disclose a serious legal or rationality error.

The Council challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an Inspector’s decision allowing an appeal under section 78 and granting temporary permission for one mobile home and one touring caravan. The permission concerned a gypsy family occupying land in a Countryside Policy Area.

The Council argued that the Inspector should have imposed a personal condition and investigated the possibility of occupation by other gypsies. It also argued that he should have considered whether the children could attend different schools if the family moved to another site. The central issues were whether those omissions rendered the decision unlawful and whether the Inspector had acted irrationally.

1. Claim dismissed. The Inspector’s decision was not vitiated by the absence of a personal condition.

2. The decision had to be read as a whole. Its central reasoning was that a temporary permission, coupled with restrictions to gypsy occupation and to one mobile home and one touring caravan, achieved an acceptable balance between harm to the countryside and the needs of the applicant’s family. The Inspector could reasonably have imposed a personal condition, but it was not irrational or otherwise unlawful to conclude that it was unnecessary.

3. The Inspector’s witness statement could not add to or gloss the reasons in the decision letter. The conclusion that a personal condition was unnecessary was properly inferred from the decision itself. The reference to the site’s long-term unsuitability was read as rejecting a personal condition in place of temporary permission.

4. The Inspector was not required to investigate, of his own motion, the possibility that another gypsy family might occupy the site. Dyason v Secretary of State for the Environment [1998] JPL 778 required a distinction between investigating an issue raised before the Inspector and investigating an issue not raised at all.

5. The Inspector was entitled to assess alternative sites by reference to the children’s existing schools. The evidence supported the view that moving from those schools would be detrimental, while there was no evidence about alternative schools, their locations, vacancies, or the likely disruption caused by transfer. The Council had to provide relevant evidence if it wished that issue to be considered.

6. Even if the reasoning had disclosed a technical error, relief would have been withheld. The alleged defect would not have affected the family’s position during the temporary permission and would not have justified reopening the planning merits.

7. The Council was ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs, summarily assessed at £4,500. There was no order as to the costs of the interested party.

First-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Inspector’s decision dated 25 October 2002 was upheld.