Fesum v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An immigration tribunal must give sufficient reasons to show how it evaluated general objective evidence and applied it to the claimant’s circumstances. It may identify a class of persons who may face persecution and decide whether the claimant falls within that class and faces a real risk. A family relationship with a politically suspect person does not, without more, establish such a risk. An appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal requires an error of law. Recasting disagreement with the tribunal’s factual assessment as irrationality or inadequate reasoning does not create such an error where the conclusion is sufficiently explained and open to the tribunal on the evidence.

The appellant, a national of Eritrea, entered the United Kingdom aged 16 using forged travel documents and claimed asylum and protection under the Human Rights Convention. He feared persecution because his father, a dissident army officer and alleged supporter of the G-15 group, had been arrested. An Adjudicator dismissed the claim, and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The appellant challenged the Tribunal’s reasoning and argued that the objective evidence established a risk on return. The central issue was whether the Tribunal had adequately explained its conclusion that the appellant, as the minor son of a supporter, was not at real risk.

Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Tuckey gave the substantive judgment. Lord Justice Waller and Sir Charles Mantell agreed.

1. The objective evidence concerning Eritrea was general and depressing, but it identified the potentially vulnerable class as persons associated with the G-15 group. The Tribunal was entitled to examine whether the appellant fell within that class and whether his individual circumstances created a real risk.
2. The Tribunal considered that the appellant’s father was only a supporter, rather than a member, of the G-15 group. It also considered that the appellant had not been sought by the authorities, had merely encountered the incident at home, and had not shown that his father was a sufficiently prominent supporter to place him at real risk. Those reasons sufficiently explained the conclusion.
3. The Court of Appeal could intervene only for an error of law. The appellant’s challenge was, in substance, that the Tribunal’s conclusion was wrong. A factual challenge cannot be converted into a legal challenge merely by describing the decision as irrational or inadequately reasoned.
4. The Court noted that a fresh claim could be made if supported by new facts. The appellant’s having reached 18 and becoming eligible for military service, together with evidence that returned draft evaders might be at risk, were matters requiring investigation if a fresh claim were made. This was additional guidance rather than a basis for allowing the appeal.

Order: appeal dismissed. The respondent was awarded costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and awarded the respondent costs.
2. Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal from the Adjudicator.
3. Adjudicator dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s rejection of the asylum and Human Rights Convention claims.